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"We have talked long enough in this country about 
equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years or 
more. It is time now to write the next chapter-and to 
write it in the books of law." 
3 
-President Lyndon B. Johnson1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern federal civil rights legislation prohibits race and gender 
discrimination in many important sectors of the American economy, 
including employment, education, public accommodations, housing, 
and credit.2 No comparable comprehensive federal civil rights 
legislation bans race and gender discrimination in the business of 
insurance-a business at the core of legal and social organization, 
culture,3 and finance. 4 Why not? 
1 109 CONG. REC. 17, 22839 (1963) (statement of President Johnson); see also ROBERT A. 
CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON, at xv (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201, 401, 703, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting discrimination 
in education and public accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion, or national 
origin; and in employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin); Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801-10, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012)) (prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, or religion, with prohibitions, against sex discrimination added 
in 1974 by Pub. L. No. 93-383, §808, 88 Stat. 633, 729); Education Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901-07, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in education or in 
activities receiving federal financial assistance); Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-495, § 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691±) 
(prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions on the basis of race, national origin, 
religion, sex, marital status, age, or because of the receipt of public assistance). 
3 See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 5 (2004) (explaining that ideas 
and institutions organized around risk, security, and the actuarial categories of insurance 
"remain at the heart of much of our law''); RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS 
GOVERNANCE 4-13 (2003) (stating that, because risk is central to contemporary governance, 
insurance is a core institution in society); EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF 
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1-3 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing 
how insurance has become central to industrialized societies in the twentieth century). 
4 Insurance premiums totaled approximately seven percent of the gross domestic 
product of the United States in 2012. At the end of that year, the life, health, property, and 
casualty sectors reported $7.3 trillion in total assets, about half the size of total assets held 
by insured depository institutions. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., ANNUAL 
REPORT ON THE INS. INDUS. 5 (June 2013). 
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Insurance provides an essential financial safety net for those 
who suffer the catastrophic loss of their spouse, home, health, or 
livelihood. For over a century and a half, individual members of 
groups historically subjected to invidious discrimination have been 
denied access to insurance coverage or have paid higher rates (or 
received lesser coverage) when classified by race5 or sex.6 As a 
result, they have been less able to achieve economic security for 
themselves and their families. 7 Moreover, the use of such 
classifications has preserved and reinforced traditional cultural 
assumptions about racial or gender groups-a harm to those 
groups, the individuals in those groups, and, more fundamentally, 
to our society as a whole.8 
Despite important incremental reforms during the last half 
century, many such practices persist in today's insurance 
markets.9 Industry opposition to unisex rates in individual life, 
annuity, disability, and auto insurance remains well entrenched, 
in part because of the insurance industry's long-established 
infrastructure to identify and classify risk. 10 Using tools it 
developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
effectively discriminate within diverse groups, the life insurance 
5 E.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 316, 955 (1944) (discussing race-based insurance practices in America from the 
nineteenth century to the beginning of the modern civil rights era). 
6 Mary L. Reen, From Coverture to Contract: Engendering Insurance on Lives, 23 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 335, 337 & n.3 (2011). Beginning in the mid-1840s, for example, American 
insurers began charging women higher rates than men for life annuities, insurance 
products that protect insured individuals against outliving their resources. Id. at 337. 
Prior to the 1840s, unisex rates and benefits had been the industry norm in the United 
States for both life insurance and annuities. SHARON ANN MURPHY, INVESTING IN LIFE: 
INSURANCE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 40 (2010). By the end of the nineteenth century until 
after the mid-twentieth century, insurance companies generally charged women higher 
rates than men for life annuities but unisex rates for life insurance, after largely 
abandoning a life insurance surcharge for women of child-bearing age adopted after the 
Civil War. Reen, supra, at 371-74. Greater consistency in the use of gender for pricing 
purposes by insurers is a relatively recent development. Insurers currently tend to charge 
women higher rates than men for life annuities and disability insurance, and lower rates for 
life insurance and auto insurance. Historically, however, members of groups subjected to 
invidious discrimination have been likely to pay higher rates for insurance coverage, and in 
some periods, have been denied coverage altogether. See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
1 Reen, supra note 6, at 382-84. 
s See id. (summarizing how race-based and gender-based insurance rates are historically 
grounded in traditional ideologies about those groups). 
9 See discussion infra Part Ill. 
10 See discussion infra Part II. 
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industry has built an infrastructure full of statistical distinctions 
to measure and price human difference, and in so doing, it has 
created what has been described as a "science of difference."11 The 
distinctions used by the American insurance industry have 
variously focused on age, geographical location, race, medical 
condition or impairment,12 and beginning after the mid-twentieth 
century for life insurance policies, on gender.13 
Past efforts at reform of the industry have accomplished limited 
reforms in some states for certain types of insurance.14 In the 
1970s and 1980s, women's rights and civil rights groups succeeded 
under federal law in eliminating gender-based pricing for 
employment-related insurance and retirement benefits 15 and 
achieved additional reforms in certain states with equal rights 
amendments. 16 Nevertheless, the industry's risk classification 
infrastructure and state-by-state regulation of insurance products 
have made comprehensive reform quite difficult to achieve.17 After 
the failure to achieve ratification of a federal Equal Rights 
11 See Dan Bouk, The Science of Difference: Developing Tools for Discrimination in the 
American Life Insurance Industry, 1830-1930, 12 ENTERPRISE & Soc'¥ 717, 717 (2011) 
(examining the tools used to build this discriminatory system and naming this practice "the 
science of difference"). 
12 Id. at 717-27. 
13 See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. In the late 1950s and 1960s, some 
companies began offering lower rates for life insurance coverage of women-the mirror 
image of higher life annuity rates for women-to reflect women's lower average rates of 
mortality (and longer average life expectancies) compared to those of men. Heen, supra 
note 6, at 383. 
14 For a recent study of state antidiscrimination laws applicable to various lines of 
insurance, including life, health, disability, auto, and property and casualty, see Ronen 
Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 
235-52 (2014), showing state-by-state results for race and gender as well as other 
policyholder characteristics. The authors conclude that state insurance antidiscrimination 
laws vary in substance and in intensity of regulation across lines of insurance, across 
policyholder characteristics, and across states, and that "a surprising number of 
jurisdictions do not have any laws restricting insurers' ability to discriminate on the basis of 
race, national origin, or religion." Id. at 196. 
15 See discussion infra Part 111.c. 
16 See discussion infra Part 111.D. 
17 See discussion infra Part 111.E. 
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Amendment, further reform efforts were largely unsuccessful, 18 
until now. 19 
Two recent developments suggest that legislative reform efforts 
may once again be timely. First, the enactment by Congress of 
gender nondiscrimination requirements, effective in 2014, as part 
of federal health care reform legislation,20 provides an alternative 
approach to risk sharing as well as a cooperative framework for 
the states and the federal government to review and reconfigure 
their respective insurance regulatory roles.21 Second, significant 
recent policy shifts abroad provide an impetus for reconsideration 
of these issues in the United States. Most notably, since 2012 new 
commercial insurance policies sold in Europe have been subject to 
the requirement of unisex rates and benefits under a 2011 ruling 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union, 22 influenced in part 
by civil rights principles articulated in the 1970s by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.23 
This Article proposes comprehensive federal legislation to 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, and sex in insurance coverage, rates, and benefits. 
It begins by placing the principal fairness arguments24 in favor 
18 See discussion infra Part III. 
19 See Denise Grady, Overhaul Will Lower the Cost of Being a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 2010, at D2 (explaining that the new health care law forbids sex discrimination in 
health insurance); infra Part IV.A. 
20 See Grady, supra note 19; discussion infra Part IV. 
21 Study of the federal government's prospective role in the regulation of insurance other 
than health insurance is also underway pursuant to provisions enacted by Congress in 
response to the financial crisis. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, § 502, 31 U.S.C. §§ 313-315 (2013); see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
22 Case C-236/09, Ass'n Beige des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Council (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://curia.europa."~u/juris/document.jsf?text=&docid=80019&pagelndex=O&doclang 
=EN&mode=lst&occ=first&part=l&cid=910025; see also European Commission, Guidelines 
on the Application of Council Directive 20041113/EC to insurance, in the light of the 
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-236/09 (Test-Achats), 
2012 O.J. (C 11) 1, 25 (EC) [hereinafter EC Guidelines] (describing new guidelines in place 
after Article 5 of Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implemented the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods 
and services, especially insurance); discussion infra Part IV.c. 
2a See discussion infra Part III.c. 
24 This Article focuses primarily on fairness rather than efficiency-based arguments, 
although it addresses the issue of efficiency costs posed by legal restrictions on insurers' 
risk classification practices. For a recent summary of the leading efficiency and fairness 
arguments for and against antidiscrimination laws in insurance, see Avraham et al., supra 
note 14, at 201-20. 
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and against the legislation in historical perspective, a perspective 
that has been largely missing from the discussion to date. In Part 
II, I advance the argument that the insurance industry's 
justification of its practices based on "actuarial fairness" or 
"equity" contains within it inherent contradictions and tensions. 
Those tensions were resolved by the industry in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in a way that created a specialized 
insurance understanding of equity, one that bases individualized 
determinations of risk on membership in a group classification, 
including those groups historically subjected to invidious 
discrimination. 25 
Part III examines previous unsuccessful efforts to enact such 
nondiscrimination legislation as well as alternative strategies used 
to achieve change, including state-by-state legislation, state and 
federal litigation, and incremental federal legislation, revealing 
important lessons for future reform. Part IV discusses recent 
legislative and legal developments, domestic and international 
policy shifts, and impending demographic challenges that make 
consideration of nondiscrimination legislation by Congress 
desirable once again. In the end, I conclude that it is now time to 
write the next chapter: Congress should enact legislation to 
address this important gap in our nation's civil rights laws. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS ABOUT "EQUITY" IN INSURANCE 
Insurance experts and civil rights advocates often talk past 
each other when discussing fairness issues in insurance. This is 
sometimes explained as the difference between an insurance 
industry's emphasis on group fairness versus the civil rights 
emphasis on individual fairness. 26 Those who defend insurance 
pricing distinctions based on gender point to the overall fairness to 
groups of policyholders, who may exhibit different patterns of 
2s See discussion infra Part II.A. 
2s Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 403, 442 (1985}; see also Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 
131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518 (1983) (describing the tension between individual autonomy and 
intragroup solidarity in the insurance classification controversy). 
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mortality or morbidity in age groups classified by gender.27 
Statistical differences between groups of men and women should 
be reflected in the pricing of products, they argue.28 As a leading 
insurance law scholar recently observed, "[p]erhaps the strongest 
explanation for insurance law's apparent reluctance to regulate 
insurance classification in a more egalitarian manner is that doing 
so could create more adverse selection and cross-subsidization 
than most people would find acceptable."29 
On the other hand, those who oppose gender-based pricing 
distinctions argue that classifications based on gender, like those 
based on race, should not be used to determine the rates and 
benefits of individual policyholders.30 They argue that the 
27 See Abraham, supra note 26, at 442 (describing the argument, made by those who 
defend the use of sex-based classifications, that men and women should be treated equally 
as groups). 
28 Insurers have long maintained that race and sex classifications may be more efficiently 
applied by the industry than certain alternative behavioral groupings in part because they 
are fixed, nonvoluntary, and easily verifiable characteristics. See id. at 424 (describing how 
reliable classification groups benefit insurers the most). Ultimately, however, it may come 
down to how one balances efficiency concerns against issues of equity in this context. E.g., 
id. at 441-45, 449 ("A certain amount of inefficiency in the entire system ... may be part of 
the price that must be paid to achieve a fairer distribution of risk."). 
29 Kenneth Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 693 (2013) 
(referring generally to limits on an insurer's authority to vary premiums based on the 
degree of risk posed by the insured). In the context of uniform non-discrimination rules, the 
primary adverse selection concern would be that the less risky would seek non-insurance 
methods of loss protection. Abraham, supra note 26, at 446-47. For a discussion and 
critique of the issue of adverse selection in the design and regulation of insurance markets, 
see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 
YALE L.J. 1223, 1223 (2004) (referring to adverse selection as a phrase coined by insurers 
"to describe the process by which insureds utilize private knowledge of their own riskiness 
when deciding to buy or forgo insurance"), and Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39, 77 (2010) (concluding that 
adverse selection and coverage-risk correlation varies substantially across different lines of 
insurance and even across segments of the same market). 
A recent study by Professors Avraham, Logue, and Schwarcz argues that much of the 
variation among state insurance anti-discrimination laws can be explained by focusing on 
three factors, (1) the predictive capacity of the characteristic in question, (2) the extent of 
the adverse selection problem created if the.characteristic is restricted, and (3) the extent to 
which the characteristic is considered a socially suspect classification. Ronen Avraham et 
al., Explaining Variation in Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws 3 (U. of Texas Law, Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 522, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-54, U. of 
Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-018, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstr 
act=2316866. 
3° Civil rights advocates argue that certain fixed characteristics of individuals should not 
be used to deny equal opportunity or result in lesser economic security. See generally, e.g., 
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mortality or morbidity of an individual overlaps to a considerable 
degree with that experienced by both men and women, and that it 
is unfair to individuals to be charged premiums based on gender-
defined group averages rather than on other less invidious 
characteristics that might affect mortality or morbidity, such as 
smoking or other risky behavior or medical history.31 Race and sex 
classifications, they point out, function largely as proxies for 
certain other favored or disfavored risk characteristics.32 
Moreover, civil rights advocates maintain that fairness to groups 
of policyholders should not obscure the harm that the use of such 
generalizations has on individual members of those groups and on 
society as a whole.33 
The story of how the insurance concept of "equity"34 developed, 
however, is more complex than suggested by the above-described 
choice between group fairness versus individual fairness. The 
concept of equity or actuarial fairness to policyholders that took 
hold in the insurance industry in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries-and still holds sway today-places emphasis 
on group classifications as well as highly individualized notions of 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing inequalities in basic rights founded 
on fixed natural characteristics). 
31 See Abraham, supra note 26, at 436-41 (describing a criticism of the use of gender or 
race as risk classifications based on the view that they are neither in the insured's control 
nor the cause of a risk of loss). By grouping risk according to gender or race rather than on 
individuals' choices or behaviors, insurers engage in statistical discrimination that fails to 
take account of individual differences. For discussion of the argument that the anti-
discrimination principle itself operates as a generalization not only to prohibit irrelevant 
discrimination but also, and more importantly, to prohibit generalizations that appear to 
rest on a sound statistical foundation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, 
AND STEREOTYPES 151-53 (2003). 
32 E.g., Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: 
A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 538-58 (1980) (asserting that 
environmental and behavioral factors, rather than genetics, largely explain the difference 
between male and female mortality rates). 
33 See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 154 (discussing how, even if statistically rational, 
gender-based discrimination is wrong). 
34 The insurance concept of "equity" is also sometimes referred to as "actuarial fairness" 
or "fair discrimination." See Deb~rah A. Stone, Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287, 292-93 (1993) (''When they speak of equity ... insurers 
espouse the principle of actuarial fairness."). State insurance laws typically prohibit only 
"unfair discrimination" between individuals "of the same class and of equal expectation of 
life" in rates charged or benefits received. E.g., N.Y. LAW§ 4224 (McKinney 2013). 
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risk assessment.35 An understanding of how that concept 
developed and has been applied defines more sharply the conflict 
between the insurance concept of "equity'' and fundamental civil 
rights principles. 
In the discussion below, I first outline the types of risk 
classifications used by life insurers in the nineteenth century and 
then examine how a specialized understanding of "fairness" or 
"equity'' developed in ordinary commercial life insurance markets 
in the latter part of that century. Next, I contrast that 
understanding of fairness in private commercial markets with an 
alternative, more communitarian understanding of risk sharing 
that for various reasons lost ground to the commercial model in 
the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
A. EQUITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY COMMERCIAL INSURANCE 
This section focuses on the early development of ideas about 
equity in commercial life insurance markets. These ideas 
developed in ordinary life insurance markets in the 1860s, and 
they later became influential across other lines of commercial 
insurance.36 During the Civil War, Americans experienced 
enormous loss of life37 and fundamental shifts in the nature of 
work and daily life. 38 Along with an increasingly industrialized 
economy came new risks for workers and an expansion of 
commercial life insurance markets, as well as the development of 
alternative cooperative approaches to risk sharing. 39 
At the time that ideas about equity in commercial insurance 
took hold, race or geographic location, but not gender, were used as 
35 See Stone, supra note 34, at 292-94 (describing this "deep contradiction" in commercial 
insurance). The concept of equity or actuarial fairness that developed in the life insurance 
context has been influential across lines of insurance, including health insurance. See id. at 
292-300 (tracing the language of actuarial fairness at the heart of recent health insurance 
debates to concepts developed by insurance companies in life insurance markets). 
36 Id. 
37 E.g., DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR, at xi-xviii (2008) (presenting data on the large number of American lives lost 
during the Civil War). 
38 WITT, supra note 3, at 22-29 (discussing how industrialization affected the work 
environment and accident rates). 
39 Id. at 71-85 (describing the growth of the cooperative insurance movement). 
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risk classification groupings for individual life insurance.40 Before 
the Civil War, women were covered by ordinary life insurance in 
small percentages compared to men and were generally charged 
unisex rates.41 
In the specialized "industrial" insurance markets that 
developed after the Civil War, however, nearly half of those 
insured were female and about twelve percent of policyholders 
were African-American.42 In those markets, companies like John 
Hancock, Prudential, and Metropolitan Life provided small 
individual life policies to each member of the families of the 
"industrious" classes of low-income wage earners by collecting a 
few cents a week from each household. 43 
When race-based life insurance rates were first adopted in 
those markets after the end of Reconstruction, African-American 
men, women, and children were charged higher rates for coverage 
or received two-thirds of the benefits provided to white 
policyholders.44 As a rationale for the race-based distinctions, the 
companies pointed to the higher average rates of mortality and 
shorter average life expectancies for black policyholders compared 
40 MURPHY, supra note 6, at 39-45 (explaining that factors like geographic location 
initially received more focus than gender); Mary L. Heen, Ending Jim Crow Life Insurance 
Rates, 4 NW. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 360, 362-70 (2009) (describing race classifications used in 
the insurance industry). 
41 MURPHY, supra note 6, at 14-45 (describing the mortality tables in use, the pricing 
practices, and the percentage of policies covering women among the major American life 
insurance companies operating during the years before the Civil War). 
42 Heen, supra note 40, at 378-79 n.150 (noting that 47.8% of Metropolitan's insured 
lives were white females and 12.5% were "colored policyholders" of which slightly more than 
half were female). 
43 Heen, supra note 6, at 365-71 (discussing this type of individual life insurance, variously 
called "industrial," "weekly premium," "debit," or "burial" insurance, designed to provide 
protection against the financial burden of a last illness and burial for the "industrious" or 
wage-earning classes); see, e.g., MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, at v (1944) (noting that under industrial life insurance policies, "the units of 
insurance [were] smaller, and the premiums [were] payable weekly ... and 
usually ... received ... by agents at the policyholders' homes"). By 1905, Metropolitan Life, 
Prudential, and John Hancock accounted for about ninety-five percent of this market, and 
industrial life insurance constituted about seventeen percent of all life insurance. Roger L. 
Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case of 
Stifled Innovation, 1868-1905, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 379, 385 n.15 (1987). 
44 Heen, supra note 40, at 375. The rate differentials and two-thirds coverage echoed 
slavery-era rates charged slaveholders for insurance coverage on slaves. See id. at 366 & 
n.44 (stating that insurance companies provided slaveholders coverage for slaves at higher 
rates and with policy amounts limited to two-thirds of value). 
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to those of white policyholders.45 Higher policy premium rates or 
lower payouts for African-Americans survived in that market for 
well over a century.46 
After many years of applying "substandard" mortality tables 
and rates to black men, women, and children, race-merged 
mortality tables and rates were finally developed for prospective 
use by the industry in the 1960s, 47 although payments equalizing 
benefits under older policies did not come for many policyholders 
until decades later.48 Pressure from civil rights organizations, a 
transformation in scientific and societal views about race after 
World War II, post-war marketplace changes, the development of 
standardized race-merged tables by professional actuarial 
organizations, private party litigation, and late twentieth century 
investigations by state insurance departments all contributed to 
the industry's eventual abandonment of explicit race-based life 
insurance pricing, despite continuing race-correlated mortality 
differentials. 49 
At the same time that the industrial life insurance companies 
developed race-segregated classifications and rates, they used 
gender-merged mortality tables and applied unisex rates. 50 
Statistics kept by the companies, however, showed that male 
policyholders experienced higher average rates of mortality and 
45 See id. at 378-79 (describing how Metropolitan raised rates for blacks based on tables 
showing that black mortality rates were higher than white mortality rates). Some 
companies later refused to insure the lives of African·Americans, referring to them in a 
form of scientific racism as ''biologically inferior," a "dying race," and thus not good risks. 
Id. at 377-78 (citing Paul Finkelman, Introduction to FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS 
AND TENDENCIES OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO, at i-vii (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004) 
(1896)); see also Benjamin Alan Wiggins, Managing Risk, Managing Race: Racialized 
Actuarial Science in the United States, 1881-1948, at 31-83 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file at the University of Minnesota Library) 
(describing how insurance companies relied on Hoffman to justify race-based rates). 
46 Heen, supra note 40, at 368-70 (noting that some companies did not change their race-
based policies until the early 1980s or later); see also J. Gabriel McGlamery, Case Note, 
Race Based Underwriting and the Death of Burial Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 531, 531-
43 (2009) (noting that insurance companies in the twentieth century continued to charge 
African-Americans higher policy premium rates while offering them sub-standard plans). 
47 Heen, supra note 40, at 380-81 (noting that the race-merged tables were developed by 
the industry despite statistics showing continuing race-correlated mortality differentials). 
48 Id. at 382-83 (noting that some policies sold in the Jim Crow era containing racially 
unequal premiums remained in force in the twenty-first century). 
49 Id. at 397-99. 
50 Heen, supra note 6, at 368-69. 
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shorter average life expectancies than female policyholders at 
nearly all ages. 51 Despite these differentials, white males were 
not treated on the basis of gender as "substandard" for pricing 
purposes compared to white females.52 
By contrast, for life annuities, which at that time were 
frequently used by well-to-do families to support dependent or 
elderly relatives or to fund marriage settlements or separate 
estates for married women,53 insurance companies generally 
utilized sex-segregated mortality tables and charged gender-
distinct rates.54 Women were charged higher policy premium rates 
for annuities or received lower periodic benefits during their lives 
than men of the same age.55 As a rationale for men's lower rates 
(or higher periodic benefits), the companies pointed to men's 
higher average rates of mortality and shorter average life 
expectancies, concluding that men would require fewer payments 
during their lives, compared to those of women.56 
Such inconsistencies in the use of gender and race 
classifications by the insurance industry in different products or 
markets reflected a certain tolerance for cross-subsidization or 
redistribution of risk in certain situations, but not in others. The 
risk groupings and rates adopted by commercial companies in the 
nineteenth century, as I argue elsewhere, tended to reflect and 
reinforce race and gender hierarchies and roles, especially when 
mortality statistics aligned with such norms; they did not 
represent merely a greater tolerance in products like industrial life 
insurance for more redistribution among policyholders. 57 
By its very nature, insurance represents some redistribution of 
amounts contributed in the form of premiums to those in the group 
who suffer the misfortune of loss. Risk sharing among 
policyholders is at the heart of insurance. By protecting against 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at 344, 350--52 (describing the functions of early life annuity contracts). 
54 Id. at 350--60, 374-77. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 374-77. 
57 See id. at 381-84 (arguing that nineteenth century gender ideology combined with 
certain legal and social changes influenced the development of gender-distinct life annuity 
rates); Heen, supra note 40, at 377-79 (arguing that nineteenth century race ideology 
combined with certain legal and social changes influenced the development of race-based 
life insurance rates). 
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financial loss to dependents from an early death of a breadwinner, 
for example, life insurance shifts wealth from those who live a long 
time to those who live a short time. On the other hand, 
commercial life insurance also has long been marketed as an 
investment vehicle for those who live longer lives, that is, as a type 
of savings account. 58 Those two aspects of ordinary life insurance, 
redistribution and accumulation, tend to be in conceptual tension 
with each other. How that tension was resolved by the life 
insurance industry in its formative years explains much of the 
industry's resistance to change. It was resolved in a way that 
limited the redistributive aspects of insurance and linked 
individual accumulations to categorical risk groupings. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the concept of 
"equity'' in life insurance developed from the idea that the policy 
owners who "overpay'' for insurance, especially in the early years 
of a level premium policy, acquire an individual interest in the 
savings or investment element of insurance.59 That idea required 
companies to distinguish the "savings" and "expense" (costs of 
marketing, etc.) portions of the premium from the "insurance" 
portion for that policyholder, leading to assessments of the risk of 
loss within multiple classes of policyholders.60 
One of the first state insurance commissioners, Elizur Wright of 
Massachusetts,61 was instrumental in articulating and 
implementing these ideas.62 He argued that the failure to separate 
the various parts of the premium from each other on the books of 
insurance companies would be the equivalent of paying gold and 
58 E.g., SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF 
THE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1843-1943, at 9 (1946) (noting that, 
although the primary function oflife insurance is risk distribution, life insurance companies 
also function as financial institutions that allow policyholders to build up a surplus). 
59 See Daniel Bouk, The Science of Difference: Developing Tools for Discrimination in the 
American Life Insurance Industry, 1830-1930, at 83-84 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with Princeton University Library) (describing 
the origin of the idea that policyholders had a property right in overpayment). 
60 See id. at 64-120 (tracing these historical developments and the related bookkeeping 
innovations); see also Bouk, supra note 11, at 719-26 (describing how the risk assessment of 
policyholders became individualized under the theory of equity). 
61 Wright was appointed insurance commissioner for Massachusetts in 1858. PHILIP 
GREEN WRIGHT & ELIZABETH Q. WRIGHT, ELIZUR WRIGHT: THE FATHER OF LIFE INSURANCE 
232-33 (1937). 
62 See id. at 263 (describing how Wright's ideas about life insurance policies were 
eventually adopted by insurance companies). 
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silver into the U.S. Treasury as ingots, composed of two metals, 
mixed in ever-varying portions, and requiring the Secretary of the 
Treasury to employ scientific experts every year to ascertain the 
value of each metal on hand by taking the specific gravity of each 
ingot and applying the proper formula. 63 The insurance and the 
savings portions of the premium, he argued, were as real and 
distinct as gold and silver. 64 Under Wright's regulatory influence, 
bookkeeping conventions were developed to separate them and 
state regulatory requirements were imposed on companies to 
ensure financial stability of companies and equity for 
policyholders. 65 
Contained within the concept of equity, therefore, is a type of 
individualized property interest in the savings or investment 
element of insurance that depends upon allocation and linkage 
with the individual's actuarially determined "insurance" portion of 
the premium.66 This specialized notion of equity for policyholders, 
and the related valuation conventions, led to the enactment of 
nonforfeiture rules by Massachusetts and other states for lapsed 
policies, requiring insurance companies to reflect the policy's 
accumulated value by providing the policyholder with some 
additional period of coverage (or the policy's surrender value), 
despite a policyholder's failure to continue paying premiums.67 It 
also led to the dividend distribution policies adopted by the 
industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century in which the 
63 ELIZUR WRIGHT, POLITICS AND MYSTERIES OF LIFE INSURANCE 182 (1873). 
64 Id. 
65 LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, ABOLITIONIST, ACTUARY, ATHEIST: ELIZUR WRIGHT AND THE 
REFORM IMPULSE 146-49, 159-61 (1990). 
66 See id. at 156-61 (noting that Wright believed the premium consisted of an "insurance" 
portion and a "self· insurance" or "reserve" portion that belonged to the policyholders"). 
67 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 1 (1861); see generally New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 
93 U.S. 24, 35 (1876) (holding that policyholders living in the Confederacy who stopped 
payment on their premiums with northern life insurance companies were entitled to the 
equitable value of the policy arising from the premiums paid up to the time of forfeiture); 
see also MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 160-166 (1882) (relating to surrender value 
requirements). Similar legislation in New York eventually led to adoption of contractual 
provisions by life insurance companies. See J. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING LIFE 
INSURANCE: ITS HISTORY IN AMERICA 310-11, 497-98 (1942) (noting that insurance 
companies eventually capitulated to those statutory requirements and that stipulated 
surrender values became the normal practice). 
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surplus or profits of the company were distributed to mutual 
company policyholders in the form of dividends.68 
How that individualized interest was determined, however, 
became increasingly a matter of actuarial calculation and more 
closely tied to the experience of the company, particularly under 
the "contribution plan" approach to dividend distribution69 adopted 
in some form by most American life insurance companies in the 
1860s. 70 To ascertain the individual policyholder's contribution to 
the surplus before distribution of dividends, the actuary 
constructed a new life table reflecting the rate of mortality among 
all of the company's risk classes at each age, and then calculated 
the company's average rate of return on investments, and the 
percent of income spent on company expenses.71 If a class cost the 
company more than expected, its members would be required to 
bear a greater portion of the cost, reflecting the "actual cost" of the 
risk. 72 As the ·number of risk classes expanded, arguably less 
redistribution between classes occurred so that each class was 
assessed the "true cost" of their insurance, provided an interest 
return on their portion of the reserve for insurance, and then 
returned their share of the allocated surplus in the form of 
dividends.73 
Thus, the determination of the policyholder's individual 
contribution to the surplus depended upon the group in which the 
policyholder was placed. As a result, although insurance 
companies made individualized determinations of the "actual cost" 
68 Bouk, supra note 59, at 83--94. 
69 Sheppard Homans, On the Equitable Distribution of Surplus, 11 AsSURANCE MAG. & J. 
INST. OF ACTUARIES 121, 122-24 (1863) (explaining dividend distribution computations 
using a contribution plan approach). 
10 Bouk, supra note 59, at 90. 
n Homans, supra note 69, at 123 (demonstrating the use of equations to calculate 
average rate of return and percent of income spent on company expenses). 
12 Id. at 124-25. 
73 See, e.g., Ellerbe W. Carter, Suits for Accounting on Tontine Life Insurance Policies, 2 
VA. L. REV. 18, 18-22 (1914) (describing the components oflife insurance premiums and the 
legal issues involved in the "equitable" distribution of surplus in deferred dividend policies); 
see also Morton Keller, The Judicial System and the Law of Life Insurance, 1888-1910, 35 
Bus. HIST. REV. 317, 330, 333 (1961) (collecting cases regarding disputes over dividends). 
For a contemporary discussion of distribution issues raised by proposed tontine annuities, 
including technical issues related to gender neutral distributions, see Jonathan Barry 
Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions: A Solution to the State and Local Pension 
Underfunding Crisis, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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of insurance and the savings aspects of insurance for 
policyholders, those determinations were generally made based on 
the risk class or group to which the individual initially had been 
assigned. 74 This preserved and completed the process begun by 
assigning the policyholder to a risk class, with the goal of 
minimizing the redistributive aspects of insurance.75 
B. EQUITY IN FRATERNAL AND COOPERATIVE INSURANCE AND 
GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS 
As explained in the preceding section, the tension between 
redistribution and individualized risk assessments was resolved in 
the nineteenth century in a way that substantially tilted 
commercial life insurance companies toward differentiated risk 
pools and emphasized individual responsibility for risk within 
categorical groupings defined by race, gender, or other more 
mutable characteristics, such as age. 76 By contrast, certain 
nineteenth century co-operative insurance and fraternal 
organizations,77 as well as the federal government's Civil War 
pension system,78 tilted toward relatively undifferentiated risk 
pools that fostered social responsibility for risk.79 For example, at 
the time commercial industrial insurers adopted race-based life 
insurance pricing practices, the federal government paid periodic 
benefits to veterans of the Civil War, both black and white, as well 
as to their widows and orphans, based on their service 
14 See Bouk, supra note 59, at 85-88 (describing the cost calculations of the "contribution 
plan" used by an actuary at the Mutual Life of New York in 1863). 
15 Id. at 86. 
1s ERICSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 50-52 (describing how commercial insurance 
companies group individuals into detailed classes of risk). 
77 WITT, supra note 3, at 71-72 (describing cooperative models as advancing a vision for 
cooperative reconstruction of the social and economic conditions experienced by 
workingmen). 
78 Id. at 23-24 (describing how the Civil War pension program provided aid to injured 
veterans after the war); FAUST, supra note 37, at 268 (describing Civil War pensions as 
instilling a "dramatically new understanding of the relationship of the citizen and the 
state"). 
79 WITT, supra note 3, at 71-72, 149 (describing how cooperative and fraternal 
organizations fostered social responsibility and identifying Civil War pensions as the basis 
of social welfare programs like workmen's compensation). 
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entitlements, rather than on age or race-correlated life 
expectancy. 80 
Cooperative and fraternal models were also based upon a more 
egalitarian or social solidarity notion of fairness, in which the risk 
pool or community shared in the loss more equally through 
assessments, regardless of the individual's contribution to the 
overall risk.81 Because fraternal organizations tended to be 
organized on racial, ethnic, occupational, gender or religious 
lines,s2 however, the redistribution that occurred was within their 
own membership rather than across diverse racial or ethnic 
groups.83 
Some excluded from all-white, all-male fraternal organizations 
formed their own associations or auxiliary organizations.84 Many 
of these organizations provided insurance for their members at a 
time when commercial life insurance companies refused to sell 
80 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 107, 129 (1992). However, many workers and poor 
people, including former slaves, were left out altogether. Id. at 135. Skocpol estimated that 
between 1880 and 1910, the federal government devoted over a quarter of its expenditures 
to pensions, and by 1910, about twenty-eight percent of all American men aged sixty-five or 
over received federal benefits averaging $189 per year, and over 300,000 widows, orphans, 
and other dependents were also receiving benefits. Id. at 65. 
8! See WITT, supra note 3, at 72 (describing the cooperative insurance movement and its 
reliance on social rituals and symbols to forge solidarity and discourage selfishness of 
members). 
82 MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910: A STUDY IN THE 
LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 10-11 (1963) (explaining that "[t)he great age of the 
fraternals began in the 1870's, and that they grew with the ensuing decades of 
industrialization and immigration until by 1895 their insurance in force surpassed that of 
the regular life companies," but arguing that their "very nature prevented individual 
societies from attaining any considerable size" because their "essence was exclusivity" and 
"protection from the surrounding milieu," while regular life insurance companies provided 
an "adaptation to an urban, industrial society'') . 
83 MARY ANN CLAWSON, CONSTRUCTING BROTHERHOOD: CLASS, GENDER, AND 
FRATERNALISM 4 (1989) (describing fraternalism as an identifiable social and cultural form 
"defined in terms of four characteristics--a 'corporate' idiom, ritual, proprietorship, and 
masculinity''). AB Clawson points out, women's involvement in voluntary associations, such 
as women's clubs, were primarily middle-class activities. Id. at 250. ''Public life in working-
class communities, on the other hand, occurred primarily through electoral politics, trade 
unionism, and fraternal orders, all of which were closed, in practice ... to women." Id. 
84 See id. at 193-96 (describing the rise of women's fraternal organizations and 
auxiliaries); Heen, supra note 40, at 383 & n.187 (discussing black fraternal organizations). 
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such coverage to African-Americans,85 or more generally, to 
women.86 A few of them, like the post-Civil War fraternal benefit 
societies formed by former slaves,87 later evolved into African-
American owned commercial insurance companies or other 
enterprises, illustrating the challenges as well as the opportunities 
encountered by fraternal and cooperative insurance societies in 
implementing a more communitarian risk-sharing model.88 
White women also formed such organizations.89 For example, a 
women's auxiliary of an all-white, all-male fraternal organization 
created a life insurance society later known as the Woman's 
Benefit Association.90 The all-women's organization91 provided a 
combination of low-cost life insurance, social opportunities, and a 
forum in which to cultivate organizational and business skills.92 It 
issued its first insurance policies on an assessment basis,93 and by 
86 Reen, supra note 40, at 383 ("As the race.based policies of white insurance companies 
in the late nineteenth century evolved, black fraternal and benevolent societies added 
insurance features to their benefits programs."). 
86 See infra note 90. Beginning after the Civil War, some companies began refusing life 
insurance coverage of women and others began impos1ng surcharges on women of child-
bearing age. Reen, supra note 6, at 371-74. 
87 For discussion of the insurance programs provided by those organizations and the 
commercial enterprises developed by former employees of the Grand Fountain, United 
Order of the True Reformers and the Independent Order of St. Luke, see generally Reen, 
supra note 40, at 383-89. 
88 Id. at 387. 
89 CLAWSON, supra note 83, at 193-96. 
00 DAVID T. BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES 
AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 1890-1967, at 31-32 (2000). The fraternal order, the Knights of the 
Maccabees, started in Ontario, Canada, and in 1878, crossed the border into Michigan with 
national organizational ambitions in the United States. Theda Skocpol et al., A Nation of 
Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States, 94 AM. POL. 
Ser. REV. 527, 529 n.2, 530 (2000). 
01 When the women's auxiliary of the Knights of the Maccabees considered honorary 
memberships for men, Bina West, who led the organization from 1911 to 1948, explained in 
1891 that "L.0.T.M.," which means Ladies of the Maccabees, may also be construed to 
mean, "Leave out Those Men." BEITO, supra note 90, at 31, 33 & n.53 (citing Bina West's 
first address, Oct. 21, 1891, Woman's Life Insurance Society Papers, Port Huron, Mich.). 
L.0.T.M. could also at that time have meant "Leave Out Those Minorities." It wasn't until 
1966, over thirty years after admitting men as members, that the organization amended its 
bylaws to eliminate any reference to race as a qualification for benefit or social membership. 
KEITH L. YATES, AN ENDURING HERITAGE: THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF NORTH 
AMERICAN BENEFIT AsSOCIATION (FORMERLY WOMAN'S BENEFIT ASSOCIATION) 377 (1992). 
02 YATES, supra note 91, at 31-33. 
0a Id. at 98 (noting that L.0.T.M. members were assessed at the same rates used by the 
men in the Knights of the Maccabees). 
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the end of 1900 had nearly eighty-five thousand members and 
insurance in force of over $62 million.94 
A major challenge faced by the fraternal and cooperative 
insurance society movement was to avoid disintegration of the 
associations through the sorting and resorting of the membership 
into different risk pools (for example, splinter groups of younger 
members forming) that could support lower assessments.95 As 
John Fabian Witt has pointed out, the more established 
organizations within the movement responded by setting rates in 
favor of preferred risks within a pool of risks according to age and 
providing for adequate reserves for payment of liabilities.96 They 
also lobbied for uniform state legislation requiring minimum 
fraternal rate tables and reserve requirements.97 By 1919, at least 
forty states had enacted the proposed uniform legislation.98 In 
sum, to meet the challenge posed by potential disintegration, 
fraternal and co-operative insurance organizations largely 
abandoned the assessment system in the twentieth century and 
joined commercial insurers by adopting actuarial and bookkeeping 
tools to minimize the redistributional aspects of insurance within 
their organizations. 
Returning to the earlier example of a women's fraternal . 
insurance program, the evolution from an assessment system to a 
legal reserve system occurred relatively early for the Woman's 
Benefit Association.99 The Association rejected the assessment 
system in favor of "adequate rates" under a legal reserve system 
shortly after the National Fraternal Congress offered the first 
fraternal mortality table at the end of the nineteenth century.100 
94 Id. at 106. 
95 WITI, supra note 3, at 97-98 (noting that the fraternal and cooperative insurance 
system lacked the power to prevent new societies from entering the market and offering 
lower rates to young members). 
96 Id. (noting that these organizations encouraged members to revise their premium 
structures by moving away from equal assessments and toward premium rates that varied 
with the ages of the members). 
97 Id. at 98. 
9s Id. 
99 See YATES, supra note 91, at 119 (describing the system adopted by the L.O.T.M. in 
1905). 
100 Id.; see DAN M. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 799 (rev. ed. 1967) (stating that "[o]ne of the 
important developments that led eventually to widespread use of reserves by fraternals was 
the construction in 1899 of the National Fraternal Congress Table of Mortality" but tl:at "it 
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In 1901, Bina West, who had represented the Association at 
National Fraternal Congress meetings and committees since 
1894,101 set a goal for the organization to establish an "absolutely 
safe and permanent" table of rates, and a special commission was 
established to study new rates. 102 
The lower rates of mortality experienced by their members 
compared to the men's organization, combined with unisex rates 
(the practice for life insurance at that time),103 provided a financial 
safety net for the women's organization. The Association 
constructed mortality tables based on its own experience from 
1892 through 1904, and later updated the tables in 1913 and 
1925.104 In all three tables, its mortality rates were lower than 
rates based on the experience of all fraternal benefit societies.105 
Nevertheless, the Association adopted the National Fraternal 
Congress standard unisex ratings, with a ten cent monthly tax for 
management expenses for all new members admitted after 1904, 
noting that "adoption of this table as a standard places our 
organization in a position of absolute security for the future."106 
By 1906, it had over one hundred fifty thousand members and a 
reserve of one million dollars.107 
was many years before model valuation legislation applicable to fraternals was finally made 
effective in most of the states"). 
101 YATES, supra note 91, at 61. Bina West continued her active involvement in 
subsequent years, and was elected the first woman President of the National Fraternal 
Congress in 1925. Id. at 231. 
102 Id. at 100-01, 108 (reporting that the rate study commission was instructed to work 
with a similar group from the men's organization and a consulting actuary, Abb Landis, and 
report back to the next convention). 
103 Heen, supra note 6, at 373, 377 (noting that gender-merged mortality tables and 
unisex premium rates for life insurance coverage of men and women was the industry norm 
at the beginning of the twentieth century). 
104 YATES, supra note 91, at 99 (reporting that the statistics were established by Frances 
Partridge, which were used by consulting actuary Miles Dawson to create the mortality 
table for women). Frances Partridge later became one of the first female actuaries in the 
United States; in the 1920s, she served as an officer of the Fraternal Actuarial Association. 
See The Fraternal Monitor, vol. 31, no. 2, at 40 (Sept. 1920) (reporting Partridge's election 
as an officer of the Fraternal Actuarial Association). 
10s YATES, supra note 91, at 99-100. 
10s Id. at 119. 
107 Woman's Life Highlights, WOMAN'S LIFE, https://www.womanslife.org/about-us/histo 
ry/timeline/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014); Bina West: Founder of the Woman's Life Insurance 
Society, HISTORY'S WOMEN, http://www.historyswomen.com/socialreformer/binawest.html 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
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An Association leader, Lillian Hollister, credited the longer life 
span of women to their healthful habits, pointing out that unlike 
men, women do "not stay out late at night, do not chew, smoke, or 
drink."108 Most of the members, as reported in an actuarial study 
published in 1918, worked as housewives at the time of initiation, 
with a much smaller percentage of dressmakers, office workers, 
and professionals.109 
By 1920, the Association had grown to over two hundred 
thousand members and was the largest fraternal benefit 
organization controlled exclusively by women.11° It survived the 
depression, weathered the war years, and renamed itself as the 
North American Benefit Association in 1966.rn In 1990, the 
Association reported insurance in force of over $588 million, assets 
of over $116 million, and premium income of nearly $8 million. 112 
In 1996, it reincorporated under the new name Woman's Life 
Insurance Society, 113 and it continues to provide fraternal life 
insurance and other benefits to members, with a special emphasis 
on the needs of women. 114 
Fraternal insurance generally declined in importance, however, 
as commercial insurance grew into a major modern business.115 As 
the commercial model increasingly took hold in the United 
10s BEITO, supra note 90, at 32, 35 (quoting a column in the Ladies Review from 1901, and 
pointing out that Lillian Hollister, the first grand commander of the L.O.T.M., also played a 
prominent role in women's suffrage and temperance organizations). 
109 Id. at 35 (reporting that 86.6% were housewives and that other occupations included 
sewing (mostly dressmaking) at 3.4%, office work at 1.6%, and professionals at 1.4%). 
110 Id. at 32, 242 n.48. As early as 1905, the organization described itself as a leader of 
the fraternal beneficiary societies among women. YATES, supra note 91, at 128-29. It 
counted at that time about ten women's fraternal beneficiary organizations, with a total 
membership of about five hundred thousand and protection in force of over four hundred 
million dollars. Id. at 129 (citing an article from the thirteenth anniversary issue of 
L.O.T.M.'s The Review, in October 1905). Five of the ten or so then existing women's 
fraternal beneficiary societies admitted men to membership, either as social or benefit 
members, and had men involved in management. Id. The L.O.T.M. thus counted itself as 
first in membership among women's orders, and seventh overall among the sixty-two orders 
of the National Fraternal Congress. Id. 
111 Woman's Life Highlights, supra note 107. 
112 YATES, supra note 91, at 447. 
11a Woman's Life Highlights, supra note 107. 
114 WOMAN'S LIFE, http://www.womanslife.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
115 See WITT, supra note 3, at 101 (discussing the decline of cooperative insurance in the 
United States). 
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States, 116 the development of federal governmental programs such 
as Social Security and Medicare, based on state welfare models, 
provided an alternative to the commercial approach to risk by 
putting more emphasis on social responsibility and cost sharing 
based on need.111 
In summary, a different, more communitarian vision of risk 
sharing developed in fraternal or cooperative insurance programs, 
tempered by the practical limitations posed by the definition or 
redefinition of risk pools. The fraternal insurance programs 
addressed some of those risk pool issues through uniform state 
legislation favoring more established organizations with financial 
structures similar to those of commercial companies. 
As the nineteenth century historical background shows, 
determining whether there should be governmentally imposed 
limits on how insurance risk groups are defined for the purpose of 
setting an individual policyholder's rates and benefits raises 
complex distributional and political issues that cannot be resolved 
simply as technical questions of insurance law. Resolution of the 
actuarial issues related to race-merged or gender-merged 
insurance pricing thus depends on social and cultural values as 
well as technical economic issues related to risk assessment and 
cost sharing. 118 The next part discusses how the insurance 
industry, the civil rights movement, and the legal system 
responded to these questions during the latter part of the 
twentieth century. 
Ill. PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS 
Thirty years ago, the insurance industry successfully blocked 
proposed comprehensive federal civil rights legislation that would 
11s Id. 
117 See id. at 200-07 (describing the rise of social insurance programs during the New 
Deal era). As explained by Tom Baker, although "all insurance is social so that 'the loss 
lighteth rather easily upon many than heavily upon few'-to be considered social insurance 
in the traditional sense, the insurance must be compulsory and easily available, and the 
price must bear some relation to ability to pay." Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and 
Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 
1579 (2011) (listing Medicare and Medicaid as examples of social insurance in the health 
care context). 
118 See ERICSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 (observing that insurance is "political, combining 
aspects of collective well·being and individual liberty in a state of perpetual tension''). 
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have broadly banned discrimination in insurance.119 During the 
time of these legislative reform efforts, the industry responded not 
only by strongly opposing the legislation but also by adopting more 
pervasive and consistent gender distinctions within life insurance 
markets. 120 Since then, limited but important incremental reforms 
have been achieved by civil rights and women's organizations for 
specific types of insurance coverage or in certain states. 121 
Nevertheless, piecemeal reforms by individual states or as a result 
of case-by-case litigation under existing statutes have had little 
lasting impact on large sections of our nation's insurance markets, 
including in life annuities, auto insurance, long-term disability 
insurance, and life insurance.122 
The following discussion of previous reform efforts begins with 
a brief summary of the unsuccessful efforts in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s to enact federal legislation to ban discrimination in 
insurance outside of the employment setting. It then turns to an 
explanation of the limiting impact that federal constitutional 
rulings on sex discrimination have had on constitutional 
challenges to the use of sex-based mortality classifications as well 
as a description of the practical impact of both successful and 
unsuccessful federal litigation. It concludes with a discussion of 
developments under state equal rights amendments and the 
lessons learned from those earlier reform efforts. 
A. PRIOR ATTEMPTS TO PASS FEDERAL LEGISLATION BANNING 
DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 
Throughout the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s, civil rights 
and women's organizations advocated federal legislation to ban 
discrimination in insurance.123 Although the proposed legislation 
was never enacted, it provides a well-considered starting point for 
future proposed legislation. One of the key proposed bills, the 
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, H.R. 100, sponsored by 
119 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
120 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
121 See discussion infra Part IIl.C--D. 
122 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
123 See infra notes 124, 160. 
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Representative John Dingell and others in 1979,124 prohibited any 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin regarding contracts for, or terms of, insurance policies.125 
The bill thus banned discrimination in access to coverage as well 
as discrimination in the pricing of insurance products. 
Under the initial version of the bill, administration and 
enforcement was to be delegated to the Federal Trade Commission 
(Commission), 126 along with prior state and local enforcement of 
the prohibited actions under any relevant state law.127 Complaints 
could be filed with the Commission only after exhausting all state-
based remedies within a specified time period.128 The Commission 
was empowered to initiate a civil action against an insurer after 
an investigation into the complaint, and an opportunity to comply 
within a time period, and aggrieved persons would be allowed to 
intervene in such an action.129 If the Commission chose not to 
pursue the matter, the Act also provided for a private cause of 
124 See Nondiscrimination in Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 2 
(1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings]. H.R. 100 was reintroduced in each Congress through 
1985, see infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy over the 
bill throughout this time), and remained bill number H.R. 100 through 1983. 
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 100 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Transp., and Tourism of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 
(1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings]. The text of the bill included the following findings: 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, when 
practiced by insurance companies which are engaged in commerce or whose 
activities affect commerce, in connection with the terms, conditions, rates, 
benefits, or requirements of their insurance policies and contracts (1) 
burdens the commerce of the Nation, (2) impairs the economic welfare of 
large numbers of people who rely on the protection of the insurance and 
annuity contracts, (3) constitutes unfair trade practices which adversely 
affect commerce, and (4) makes it difficult for employers to comply with 
Federal laws prohibiting such discrimination against their employees. 
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1979, H.R. 100, 96th Cong. § 2(a) (1980). 
125 H.R 100 § 2(b) (providing that "no insurer shall ... refuse to contract with any 
applicant for insurance ... [or] treat any such applicant or insured differently than any 
other applicant or insured with respect to the terms, conditions, rates, benefits, or 
requirements of any such insurance contract"). The bill defined "insurance" broadly to 
include policies and contracts (including annuity or pension contracts) "relating to life, 
accident and casualty, theft, retirement, liability, health, disability, or economic loss." Id. 
§ 3(4). 
126 Id. §§ 3(2), 5. 
121 Id. § 6(a). 
12s Id. § 6(b). 
129 Id. § 10. 
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action. 130 The bill provided for federal court jurisdiction for such 
suits regardless of the amount in controversy. 131 The remedies 
provided included injunctive relief as well as actual and punitive 
damages, attorney fees, and sanctions to force compliance.132 
Later versions of the bill were nearly identical, but gave 
enforcement power to the Attorney General of the United States 
rather than to the Federal Trade Commission.133 Although the 
1983 version of the bill was reported out of the Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Transportation and Tourism to the full House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce in April of 1983, and 
reported out of the full Committee in March 1984, the bill died 
before reaching the floor. 134 A similar Senate nondiscrimination 
bill, the Fair Insurance Practices Act, S.2204, was reported to the 
full Senate from the Commerce Committee in December of 1982.135 
Sponsors and supporters emphasized that the legislation was 
needed to bring the insurance industry in line with the established 
civil rights policy of the United States, in which persons were to be 
treated not according to membership m a class, but as 
individuals.136 They argued that insurance industry 
discrimination on the basis of sex should be banned for the same 
public policy reasons that explicit discrimination on the basis of 
race had been discredited and largely discontinued.137 They also 
130 Id. § 11. 
131 Id.§ 12. 
132 Id. § 14. 
133 See generally Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1981, H.R. 100, 97th Cong.; 
Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1983, H.R. 100, 98th Cong. 
134 Bill Summary & Status for the 98th Cong., H.R. 100, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http:// 
Thomas.loc.gov/cgi ·bin/bdquery/D?d098: 100: ./list/bss/d098HR. lst: :/TOM: bss/98search.html 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
135 See S. REP. No. 97-671, at 1-2 (1982). See generally Mary W. Gray & Sana F. Shtasel, 
Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, 71 A.B.A.J. 89 (1985) (discussing H.R. 100 and S.372, 
another version of the Fair Insurance Practices Act, as key bills introduced in the 98th 
Congress). 
136 S. REP. No. 97-671, at 1-2 (1982) (emphasizing that "no individual shall be treated 
differently because of his or her membership in a racial, sexual, religious, or ethnic group"). 
137 Id. at 5-6. The report states that in hearings on previous versions of the legislation, 
the state insurance departments of at least two states "have indicated that race 
classification in insurance would be permitted if based on 'valid actuarial tables' or 
'statistical ... reliable data." Id. at 5 n.3 (quoting 1980 Hearings, supra note 124, at 165); 
see also 1980 Hearings, supra note 124, at 165 (recording that Rep. Dingell identified the 
states as Kentucky and Nevada; Dingell pointed out, however, that industry 
representatives now acknowledge that insurance discrimination on the basis of race would 
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expressed the view that the insurance industry remains "the most 
important exception to the general Federal policy against 
discrimination," and that bans on discrimination in employment, 
housing, and credit have "not displaced State regulation of 
industries traditionally subject to State control."138 
Major insurance companies and trade organizations vigorously 
opposed the legislation.139 The insurance companies insisted that 
no effective alternative to sex-based classification existed.140 The 
purpose of sex-based rating, they maintained, was to price 
insurance fairly according to its costs, and that changing the way 
insurance companies did business would result in higher rates and 
less access to the protections of insurance.141 In addition, the 
industry argued that elimination of sex-based classifications would 
lead to the subsidization of higher risk classes by lower risk 
classes, 142 that the federal government should leave insurance 
regulation to the states,143 that women would suffer from higher 
rates if the legislation passed, 144 and that the insurance companies 
be "contrary to both public policy and to general ethics"). In addition, Rep. Barbara 
Mikulski, Member of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, in hearings on H.R. 100 
in 1981, noted that discrimination against immigrants in the insurance industry had been 
widespread, leading to the formation of fraternal organizations and alliances to create their 
own insurance associations. Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 
100 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transp. & Tourism of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 97th Cong. 17 (1981). For a summary of current state laws prohibiting race and 
national origin discrimination in insurance, see Avraham et al., supra note 14, at 239 
(noting that only twelve states have currently forbidden the use of race and national origin 
across all lines of insurance). 
138 S. REP. No. 97-671, at 16--17 (1982) (addressing the issue of state versus federal 
regulation of the business of insurance). 
139 See, e.g., 1983 Hearings, supra note 124, at 623-25 (statement of Denise F. Mullane, 
President of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company) (asserting that sex was one of 
the primary means used by life insurance companies to create accurate rates and that 
adopting of H.R. 100 would confuse companies, agents, and policyholders and increase 
premiums, among other effects). 
140 See, e.g., id. at 636--40 (statement of Barbara J. Lautzenheizer, President of the Society 
of Actuaries, and the Senior Vice President of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company). 
141 Id. at 644-45 (statement of Barbara J. Lautzenheizer, President of the Society of 
Actuaries and Senior Vice President of Phoenix. Mutual Life Insurance Company). 
142 Id. at 300 (statement of Andre Maisonpierre, Senior Vice President, Alliance of Am. 
Insurers). 
143 Id. at 481 (statement of New York State Sen. Donald M. Halperin, Conference of 
Insurance Legislators, and South Carolina State Rep. Warren Arthur, President, 
Conference oflnsurance Legislators). 
144 Id. at 363, 370, 378 (statement of Galen R. Barnes, Vice President of Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company, on behalf of the National Association of Independent Insurers) 
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would be dealt a blow from the legislation from which it might not 
recover .145 
The American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) did not take a 
position on the legislation, and its members testified both in 
opposition to and in favor of the legislation. Many actuaries 
maintained that the pricing practices were based on sound 
actuarial data, not sexual stereotypes. 146 Some, however, 
including a former Federal Insurance Administrator and then 
head of a consumer organization, strongly supported the 
legislation as a matter of principle. 147 In testifying in favor of the 
legislation, he referred to a 1979 federal government report finding 
that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC)148 "has declined to follow through on its task force findings 
that ... sex and marital status be eliminated as rating 
criteria ... and thus, uniform remedies to deficiencies in the 
current classification system will probably have to come about 
through [f]ederal legislation."149 He noted that the AAA's own 
principles establish as an important criteria that classification 
(stating that the legislation as applied to auto insurance would be "unfair to women" and 
that without the use of gender classifications and a recognition of loss experience in rating, 
insurance becomes merely a "social welfare program that pays for the accidental setbacks of 
life"). 
145 See id. at 415, 420 (statement of George K. Bernstein, United States Fiduciary and 
Guarantee Company, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Republic Insurance 
Companies, and New York State Teachers' Retirement System) (detailing the negative 
effects that passage of the bill could have on various aspects of the insurance industry). 
146 Id. at 497 (statement of Robert L. Knowles, Chair, Commission on Risk Classification, 
American Academy of Actuaries); id. at 643-44 (statement of Barbara J. Lautzenheizer, 
President of the Society of Actuaries). 
147 See id. at 391 (statement of J. Robert Hunter, President, National Insurance Consumer 
Organization) (stating that gender-based classification does not pass the "social 
acceptability test"). 
148 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is a nonprofit "regulatory 
support organization created and governed by the chief insurance regulators from the [fifty] 
states, the District of Columbia[,] and five U.S. territories. Through the NAIC, state 
insurance regulators establish standards ... conduct peer review, and coordinate their 
regulatory oversight." The NAIC also "represents the collective views of [insurance) 
regulators domestically and internationally." See NAIC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), 
NAT'L AsS'N OF INS. CoMM'RS, http://naic.org/index.htm (click "About the NAIC"; then click 
"NAIC Frequently Asked Questions") (noting also that about three percent of its funds 
comes from the states as membership dues and that the NAIC is exempted by the IRS from 
the Form 990 reporting requirements). 
149 1983 Hearings, supra note 124, at 399-400 (statement of J. Robert Hunter) (referring 
also to a study of the economics of insurance discrimination sponsored by the Federal Trade 
Commission, which was cancelled by Congress in 1980, prior to its completion). 
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systems ''be acceptable to the public" and "recognize the values of 
society."150 Therefore, he argued, it was understood by actuaries 
that social values may trump actuarial data as criteria for 
classifications. 151 
The insurance industry's determined opposition to the 
legislation killed it in the Senate after it was reported out of 
committee in 1982. 152 Senator Bob Packwood, who sponsored 
several of the insurance nondiscrimination bills during the 1980s, 
later expressed his dismay at the industry's "massive effort" to 
block the legislation: "I was discouraged and appalled ... by the 
extent to which insurance companies lobby to make sure that 
women continue to be treated unequally in insurance."153 
At about the same time H.R. 100 was under consideration by 
congressional committees, insurance industry groups were 
developing new gender-based distinctions for life insurance, opting 
to broaden and deepen the use of gender classifications rather 
than taking a more consistent unisex approach. For example, in 
the mid- to late 1970s, the NAIC studied whether it should modify 
its model state legislation establishing certain m1mmum 
recommended nonforfeiture and valuation requirements for life 
insurance companies. 154 As part of that study, the NAIC briefly 
considered the development of new gender-merged, unisex 
mortality tables to replace references to older gender-merged 
mortality tables dating from the 1940s and 1950s.155 However, as 
discussed in greater detail below, after consultation with the 
Society of Actuaries (SOA), the American Council of Life 
Insurance, and others, the NAIC for the first time adopted 
separate male and female mortality tables in place of a gender-
150 Id. at 391. 
151 Id. 
152 See Heen, supra note 6, at 383 nn.296-97 (discussing the failure of the bill). 
153 Potential Inequities Affecting Women: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., Part I, 
98th Cong. 48 (1983) (statement of Senator Bob Packwood, bill cosigner). 
154 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1977-2 NAIC 
PROC. 494 (June 5-10, 1977) [hereinafter June 1977 Proceedings]. 
155 Id.; see also Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1957-4 
NAIC PROC. 138 (Dec. 3-7, 1956) [hereinafter Dec. 1956 Proceedings] (incorporating 
permission to use a new mortality table to substitute for the 1941 Commissioners' standard 
ordinary mortality table); JOSEPH B. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 8 (9th ed. 1962) (referencing 
the gender-merged 1958 Commissioners' standard ordinary mortality table [hereinafter (1958 
CSO Table]). See infra discussion in text and notes 158-60. 
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merged table for its updated model state standard valuation 
legislation. 156 
At that time, as had been the practice beginning in the late 
1950s and 1960s, many insurance companies used a multi-year 
set-back from age-based, gender-merged mortality tables157 to 
provide lower life insurance rates for women.158 For example, if a 
three-year set-back to the 1958 Commissioners' Standard 
Ordinary (CSO) Mortality Table were used, a thirty-five year old 
woman would be quoted rates applicable to a thirty-two year old 
man without the need to separately calculate nonforfeiture values, 
policy reserves, and dividends.159 
When women's groups began organizing against discrimination 
in insurance,160 the industry became concerned about criticisms 
156 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1981·4 NAIC PROC. 
515, pt. 3 (Nov. 30-Dec. 5, 1980) [hereinafter Dec. 1980 Proceedings] (adopting for this 
purpose the newly developed sex differentiated Commissioners' 1980 Standard Ordinary 
Mortality Table [hereinafter 1980 CSO Mortality Table]). 
157 See McGill, supra note 100, at 152-62 (describing the leading mortality tables in this 
period). In 1958, for example, the Equitable Life Assurance Society adopted lower 
premiums on all plans of life insurance for women in policies of $10,000 and over. See R. 
CARLYLE BULEY, THE EQUITABLE LIFE AsSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 1859-
1964, Vol. 2, at 1261-62 (1967). In a treatise on life insurance published in the early 1960s, 
a former actuary of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York wrote "[w]ith the 
increased number of women applying for insurance, many for substantial amounts, the 
situation has changed radically and there is no longer justification for charging the same 
premium rates as for men. Practically all companies now have lower rates for women .... " 
MACLEAN, supra note 155, at 263. 
158 Dec. 1956 Proceedings, supra note 155 (approving the use of an age set-back of the 
1958 CSO Table in connection with policies on female risks, and noting that the permitted 
set-back of up to three years "takes into account that both C.S.O. Tables contain male and 
female lives in unknown proportions and that there may be instances where an age set-back 
would not be justified for a particular policy form when other cost factors as between 
policies on males and females are not the same"). The BOA at that time was asked by the 
NAIC to undertake a study of male and female mortality from the records of insured lives. 
Id.; see MCGILL, supra note 100, at 158-59 (explaining that since company mortality data 
for male and female lives "were combined in unknown proportions in the construction of the 
1958 C.S.O. Table," it was "impossible to determine precisely how large a reduction should 
be made in the rates in calculating premiums for female lives" but that the NAIC 
recommended that companies be permitted to use an age set-back of not more than three 
years). 
159 MACLEAN, supra note 155, at 109; see also Dec. 1956 Proceedings, supra note 155 
(recommending that a differential be permitted up to three years). 
iso Memorandum from Dr. Eleanor J. Lewis, Assistant Commissioner, Consumer Services, 
New Jersey Department of Insurance, to Mr. Robert T. Jackson, President, Society of 
Actuaries (Feb. 10, 1977), in June 1977 Proceedings, supra note 154, at Attachment C-7 
(noting that "[f]or several years women have been questioning insurance regulators and 
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regarding the consistency and accuracy of the use of gender 
classifications for rates but not to determine dividend 
distributions, cash surrender values, or for other valuation 
purposes.161 Thus, although women received the benefits of lower 
rates for life insurance, insurers were not generally using gender-
distinct mortality classifications for other important policy 
purposes such as nonforfeiture valuation or reserve 
requirements. 162 In addition, some in the industry recognized the 
apparent inconsistency of using gender-distinct mortality tables 
for life annuity rates but not for life insurance rates and other 
policy valuation purposes.163 
In the mid-1970s, the NAIC convened a task force to consider 
whether a new mortality table should be developed for standard 
valuation and nonforfeiture valuation regulation, and if so, 
companies about industry practices which discriminate against women in life insurance," 
focusing both on the lack of consistency regarding the use of gender distinctions and on the 
lack of a single rate for both sexes). 
181 Minutes of the Society of Actuaries Commission to Develop New Valuation Tables, in 
Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1977-4 NAIC PROC. 
478 (Dec. 6-10, 1976) [hereinafter Dec. 1976 Proceedings], Attachment F (''The consensus 
was that ... the present treatment of female lives from a public relations standpoint is not 
satisfactory."). 
182 See generally Valuation and Nonforfeiture Developments, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES 1977 
Vol. 3 No. 3 at 596-98 [hereinafter Valuation and Nonforfeiture] (statement of Waid J. 
Davidson, Jr.). Davidson explained that if cash values were computed using either gender-
distinct tables or female age set-backs, cash values of female policies would be less than the 
corresponding benefits in a male policy. That problem could be solved, he suggested, by 
using male cash values so long as they exceeded the minimum required by the female table; 
in that case, however, other nonforfeiture benefits such as paid up or extended insurance 
would produce lower non-forfeiture benefits than required by the female table. At the time, 
he noted, there was no general agreement that separate mortality tables were necessary for 
the purpose of determining cash values and reserves. See also Proceedings of the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1959-4 NAIC PROC. 187 (Dec. 15-19, 1958) 
(summarizing the view of the subcommittee that each company must decide whether it is 
justified in offering policies to female risks at a premium rate lower than for a male the 
same age on the basis of "the distribution of its business by geographical subdivision, by 
economic class, and by the marital status of the females it insures, on the basis of the 
broadness or refinement of underwriting classification in the various classes of policies that 
it offers, and on the basis of the average size of the policy, and the relative importance of 
disability [or] retirement annuity benefits in these policy classes" and noting that if a 
company decides to provide lower premium rates, "it could, of course, still compute non· 
forfeiture values and reserves on the basis of the true age of the female insured" or could on 
the other hand, "decide to compute non-forfeiture values and reserves by using those for a 
male younger than the true age of the female insured''); see also discussion supra Part II.A 
(discussing the idea of equity in insurance). 
163 Valuation and Nonforfeiture, supra note 162, at 597. 
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whether the tables should be by sex or unisex. 164 It noted that 
"[t]he use of different mortality tables by sex requires review in 
the light of views of some state legislators in disallowing the age-
setback approach and requiring either completely separate 
mortality tables by sex or only one unisex mortality table."165 The 
task force consulted with a committee formed by the Society of 
Actuaries (SOA) on these and a range of other technical issues, 
and formed an NAIC technical subcommittee to review the SOA 
report. 166 
The SOA report recommended various changes to the NAIC's 
model standard nonforfeiture law, including a modified age 
setback.167 It concluded that a "six year age setback for 
determining whole life cash values would reasonably approximate 
the results using a separate female table."168 The SOA favored an 
age setback based on the benefit of achieving simplicity in 
nonforfeiture calculations.169 In an evaluation of the SOA report, 
the NAIC technical subcommittee disagreed, although it was 
sharply divided on this point,170 stating as follows: 
The age setback adjustment does not fit the current 
mortality experience by sex. Separate mortality tables 
based on the experience by sex appear to be the only 
approach currently acceptable, unless a unisex table 
could be used. There is much uncertainty as to which 
attitudes to take to meet the views of the feminist 
movement. 171 
164 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1975-2 NAIC 
PROC. 414 (June 8-12, 1975). 
165 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1976-4 NAIC 
PROC. 520 (Dec. 7-11, 1975) [hereinafter Dec. 1975 Proceedings]. 
166 Id. 
161 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1976-2 NAIC 
PROC. 541(June7-11, 1976) [hereinafter June 1976Proceedings]. 
170 Id. ("Of the thirty comments and conclusions presented in [the SOA] report the NAIC 
Technical Subcommittee believes that half of them merit immediate inclusion in proposals 
for revision of the Standard Nonforfeiture Value Legislation and [for] only [one] (the use of 
a six year age setback for female rates and values) ... was [there] total disagreement."). 
171 Dec. 1975 Proceedings, supra note 165. A few years later, in a memorandum to the 
President of the SOA, Dr. Eleanor Lewis of the New Jersey Department of Insurance 
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Comments submitted by the American Council of Life Insurers 
favored the development of separate mortality tables for males and 
females. 172 Ultimately, the NAIC technical subcommittee 
concluded that "[e]ntirely separate mortality tables ... are 
required."173 In support of its conclusion, it noted the concern that 
"if the same values are available for both sexes then a need for 
cash value deficiency reserves may possibly be indicated."174 
Accordingly, the NAIC technical subcommittee requested that a 
SOA committee develop separate male and female mortality 
tables. 175 Later in 1976, the SOA committee observed "it was felt 
that our only choice is to develop separate tables. This choice is 
made notwithstanding the extra costs in ratebooks, file 
maintenance, computing of dividends and other increased costs. 
The committee agreed that we appear to be 'inexorably driven' to 
the development of two tables."176 As explained by an SOA 
committee member, the basic premise of their deliberations was 
that "males and females have significantly different mortality 
characteristics and recognizing this difference is not unfair 
Consumer Affairs division urged the appointment of an advisory group to advise the SOA 
committee on the less technical aspects of its decisions, including those influenced by "value 
judgements, philosophy, and basic concepts of equity." June 1977 Proceedings, supra note 
154, at Attachment C-7. The Lewis memorandum included a roster of suggested committee 
members, including insurance commissioners and their deputies, the President of the 
NAlC, and "activist" women such as Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Susan Ross, Barbara 
Shack, Professor Sylvia Law, and others. Id. I have been unable to find evidence that a 
committee with that composition was appointed. However, Eleanor Lewis later served as 
temporary chairperson of a consumer advisory committee for the NAIC technical task force. 
Proceeding of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1978-2 NAlC PROC. 
316 (June 11-16, 1978) [hereinafter June 1978 Proceedings]. The consumer advisory 
committee recommended that unisex tables be developed in each situation where a 
mortality table is prepared and made recommendations regarding the funding and 
composition of the committee. Id. After the departure of Lewis as temporary chairperson, 
Marsha Greenberger of the National Women's Law Center agreed to serve as coordinator of 
committee activities but there was no indication that the committee was ever funded as 
requested. Id. (summarizing consumer advisory committee input). 
172 Dec. 1976 Proceeding, supra note 161, at Attachment B. 
173 June 1976 Proceedings, supra note 169 (noting that "[t]he use of unisex tables will 
subsidize one sex at the expense of the other''). 
174 Id. For discussion of the increase in the cash values of women's life insurance policies 
under unisex rates, see infra note 291. 
11s June 1976 Proceedings, supra note 169. 
176 Minutes of the SOA Comm. Meeting Oct. 12, 1976, in Dec. 1976 Proceedings, supra note 
161, at Attachment F. 
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discrimination based on sex."177 On the other hand, he noted, "[i]f 
we do not accept this premise, the problem becomes very simple 
from a rate and value standpoint. We must charge men and 
women the same premium rate and use a unisex table."178 In 
addition, "[c]ash values, dividends, and reserves must also be the 
same."179 He also noted "if we wish to use higher female tables for 
annuity, disability, and medical expense policies, we are hard 
pressed to object to the lower female tables for life insurance."180 
Over the next several years, the SOA worked on developing sex 
differentiated tables, later identified as the 1980 CSO Standard 
Ordinary Mortality tables. 181 In late 1980, the NAIC adopted the 
new mortality tables for individual life insurance valuation 
purposes in its NAIC standard valuation model laws recommended 
for adoption by state legislatures.1s2 
In sum, at the time the federal nondiscrimination legislation 
was being considered, the industry, the NAIC, and the states 
responded1sa by making the use of gender distinctions in life 
insurance more consistent and pervasive, nearly a century and a 
half after their first use in life annuities. As discussed in the 
following two sections, the industry consolidated their use of such 
distinctions at the same time that legislatures and courts were 
111 Valuation and Nonforfeiture, supra note 162, at 596 (Statement of Waid J. Davidson, Jr.). 
118 Id. 
11e Id. 
lso Id. at 597. 
181 Mortality and Other Rate Tables, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, http://mart.soa.org/ Oast 
visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
152 Dec. 1980 Proceedings, supra note 156. The model standard valuation law also 
contained a multistep procedure that permitted new mortality tables developed in the 
future to become effective in a state without specifically being named in the text of the laws. 
Id. The NAIC would first approve any such new table, followed by approval by regulation 
promulgated by the Commissioner of Insurance for that state. Id. 
183 For example, the California legislature amended its insurance law, which prohibits 
"unfair discrimination" between individuals of the same class or equal expectation of life, to 
require differentials based on sex in rates, dividends, or benefits for ordinary life insurance 
or individual life annuities applied for and issued on or after January 1, 1981. CAL. INS. 
CODE § 790.03(f) (West 2014) (specifying that the "requirement is satisfied if those 
differentials are substantially supported by valid pertinent data segregated by sex, 
including, but not necessarily limited to, mortality data segregated by sex" but permitting 
differentials in rates based on certain age set-backs until an amendment specifying the use 
of sex-segregated mortality tables for nonforfeiture benefits and valuation reserves went 
into effect). 
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reviewing the use of gender distinctions in msurance and 
pensions, as well as in other areas of the law.184 
B. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: RACE AND SEX 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
On the federal legal front more generally, the women's rights 
litigation effort focused on the constitutional standard of review to 
be applied to sex-based classifications.185 Although the effort to 
establish strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have direct application to 
insurance classifications used by private companies unless state 
action could be established, 186 establishing the parallel between 
gender and race classifications as a matter of constitutional law 
could more broadly influence the public's understanding of the 
harm of gender discrimination. 
Women's rights advocates viewed the litigation strategy leading 
to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark race discrimination case, 
Brown v. Board of Education, 187 as a path-breaking model for their 
own efforts to achieve equal rights for women.188 An influential 
two-volume study of race in America, An American Dilemma, 
which was cited by the Court in Brown, 189 contained, tucked away 
184 See infra Parts III.B-D (discussing how courts, legislatures, and regulators responded 
to the industry's gender-based pricing distinctions). 
186 SERENA MAYER!, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 3 (2011) (noting that "[l]itigators argued that sex, like race, should be a 
'suspect classification' under the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
186 E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (emphasizing that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not "invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are 
within the domain of State legislation" but instead provides "modes of redress against the 
operation of State laws and the action of State officers executive or judicial when these are 
subversive of the fundamental rights" specified in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
187 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of "separate but equal" and holding 
that race segregated public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
188 E.g., MAYER!, supra note 185, at 3-4 (describing how feminists "promoted parallels 
between race and sex as legal categories" and "tried to emulate the civil rights movements' 
organizational structure and tactics"); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal 
Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 762-69 (2004) 
(describing a proposed feminism litigation strategy "modeled on the civil rights movement's 
successful transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment judicial meaning."). 
189 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
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in an appendix, 190 a lesser-known analysis of the parallels between 
race and sex discrimination.191 In the appendix, the study's 
author, Gunnar Myrdal, argued that the similarities in the 
position of, and feelings toward, women and blacks were "not 
accidental," but instead uncovered a "fundamental basis of our 
culture" and that they "were originally determined in a 
paternalistic order of society."192 He briefly summarized historical, 
social, legal, and economic factors affecting the position of women 
in American society, and noted that the problems remained even 
though paternalism was ''losing its economic basis."193 Myrdal 
concluded that although racial barriers were much stronger in 
America due to the legacy of slavery, women were still hindered in 
their economic competition ''by the function of procreation," a more 
"eternally inexorable" barrier .194 
Nearly twenty years after Brown, during the "second wave"195 of 
women's rights activism, the Supreme Court decided a key sex 
190 Although Myrdal had intended that analysis to have a more central place in the text of 
the published study, it was moved to the appendix, along with other appendices containing 
methodological notes and additional quantitative studies. See DAVID W. SOUTHERN, 
GUNNAR MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN 
DILEMMA 1944-1969 (1987): 
One issue provoked so much commotion that Myrdal backed down before 
his critics. In the 1962 edition of the Dilemma, Myrdal claimed that he had 
never been censured on any subject, not even after Pearl Harbor. (The 
State Department asked to see a copy of Myrdal's manuscript, but Myrdal, 
on Keppel's advice, refused.) He failed to reveal, however, that he removed 
the analogy between racism and sexism from the text. Like many 
nineteenth-century abolitionists, the Carnegie liberals declined, either for 
tactical reasons or because of sexism, to connect the racial issue with 
women's rights. 
Id. at 42-43 (citing Myrdal correspondence). 
19 1 GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 1073 app. 5 (1944) (providing "A Parallel to the Negro Problem"). 
192 Id. at 1078. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. (citing the work of his wife Alva Myrdal). Alva Myrdal, a prominent intellectual and 
political activist, was involved in establishing social welfare programs in Sweden, and later, 
promoted social welfare internationally. Alva Myrdal-Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http:// 
nobelprice.org/peace/laureates/1982/Myrdal-bio.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). In 1982, she 
was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for her international work in support of nuclear 
disarmament. Id.; e.g., SISSELA BoK, ALVA MYRDAL: A DAUGHTER'S MEMOIR 4 (1991) 
(discussing many events in Alva Myrdal's life, including her political and social activism and 
her Nobel Peace Prize). 
195 MAYER!, supra note 185, at 3 (referring to the "second wave" of feminists in the 1950s). 
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discrimination case, Frontiero v. Richardson.196 Justice Brennan's 
opinion for the plurality in Frontiero referred to the similarity of 
the nineteenth century legal status of women and blacks, citing 
Myrdal's An American Dilemma: 
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of 
women in our society was, in many respects, 
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War 
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold 
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, 
and married women traditionally were denied the legal 
capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal 
guardians of their own children. See generally ... G. 
Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1073 (20th 
anniversary ed. 1962).197 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg had referred the Court to the Myrdal 
appendix in support of her argument that "the legal status of 
women and children served as the model for the legal status 
assigned to black slaves."198 Her amicus brief included the 
following excerpt from An American Dilemma: 
In the earlier common law, women and children were 
placed under the jurisdiction of the paternal power. 
When a legal status had to be found for the imported 
Negro servants in the seventeenth century, the nearest 
196 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding that federal 
statutes treating men and women members of the uniformed services differently with 
regard to spousal benefits are inherently suspect classifications based on sex and are 
unjustifiably discriminatory in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding Idaho's preference of 
"males over females" as estate administrators when the degree of relationship to the 
decedent was otherwise a tie to be without a reasonable basis and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
197 411 U.S. at 685. 
198 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 
14-15, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694). Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
then a law professor and head of the newly formed ACLU Women's Rights Project, argued 
on behalf of the ACLU as amicus curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court. See Biographies of 
Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (noting Justice Ginsburg's instrumental 
role in launching the ACLU's Women's Rights Project). 
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and most natural analogy was the status of women 
and children. The ninth commandment-linking 
together women, servants, mules and other property-
could be invoked, as well as a great number of other 
passages of Holy Scripture.199 
In Frontiero, the Court came within one vote of applying the 
same constitutional standard to classifications based on sex as to 
those based on race.200 Three others, Justices Douglas, Marshall, 
and White, joined Justice Brennan's opinion.201 Justice Stewart 
concurred in the plurality's judgment.202 Justice Powell also 
concurred, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, 
arguing that the ongoing Equal Rights Amendment ratification 
process was a "compelling ... reason for deferring a general 
categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of 
judicial scrutiny."203 Justice Rehnquist dissented.204 
The fifth vote never materialized however, and the Court 
ultimately adopted an intermediate standard of scrutiny for sex-
based classifications, a less rigorous standard under the Equal 
Protection Clause than the strict scrutiny applied to race-based 
classifications. 205 
Revisiting Myrdal's observations about the parallels between 
sex and race discrimination206 prompts speculation about what 
l99 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union at 14-15, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 6 (1973) (No. 71-
1694) (citing AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1073 (2d ed. 1962)). 
200 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring); see, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the 
Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1793 (2008) (noting that the analogy to 
race helped feminists persuade judges and other decisionmakers that discrimination based 
on sex should be eradicated, and they came within one vote of a Court majority in 
Frontiero). 
201 411 U.S. at 678. 
202 Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
203 Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). 
204 Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
20s See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 210 (1976) (requiring sex-based classifications to 
be "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives" and invalidating a state 
drinking age statute differentiating between teenage boys and girls). The Court much later 
applied an augmented "skeptical scrutiny" standard in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 531 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (invalidating Virginia Military Institute's policy of excluding 
female students from admission). 
206 After Frontiero, Justice Brennan cited other portions of An American Dilemma in two 
subsequent cases, both involving race discrimination. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., majority) (upholding a private voluntary 
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"might have been" if a more complete version of women's equality 
had been embraced by the Court in Frontiero or, alternatively, in a 
subsequent case if the then ongoing efforts to ratify the Equal 
Rights Amendment207 had been successful.208 However, it also 
raises questions about the impact of the Court's sex discrimination 
decisions, a question that cannot be addressed without consulting 
the changes in society more generally.209 
Nevertheless, the intermediate level of scrutiny adopted by the 
Court, combined with its narrowing interpretation of the 
governmental action requirement for Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claims,210 made federal 
constitutional litigation an unlikely vehicle for legal reform of sex-
based practices of the private insurance industry, despite state 
regulation of the business of insurance. As discussed in the next 
section, litigation by women's rights groups under federal 
statutory law provided a much more promising avenue for 
reform.211 Federal constitutional challenges, with the exception of 
affirmative action plan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and in rejecting a 
claim of reverse discrimination by white workers, taking judicial notice of the historical 
exclusion of blacks from craft worker positions on racial grounds); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 330 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's rejection of 
the claim that Georgia's capital sentencing process was administered in a racially 
discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
207 "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972); see also Barbara A. 
Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889-900 (1971) (discussing the Equal Rights Amendment). 
20s See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 735, 747-62 (2002) (discussing the "choices ... a hypothetical set of feminist drafters 
face if they were to constitutionalize women's equality .... "). 
209 Justice Ginsburg has since attributed the courts' altered views of sex discrimination in 
large part to a "sea change" in the views and experience of women in American society. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of 
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 
268 (1997); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1185, 1204-05 (1992) ("[B]y requiring legislative reexamination of once customary sex-
based classifications, the Court helped to ensure that laws and regulations would 'catch up 
with a changed world.'" (quoting WENDY w. WILLIAMS, SEX DISCRIMINATION: CLOSING THE 
LAW'S GENDER GAP, IN THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
1969-1986, at 109 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987))). 
210 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972). But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967). 
211 Unlike constitutionally-based claims of gender discrimination, which require a showing 
of governmental action and apply an intermediate standard of scrutiny, statutory civil 
rights prohibitions reach certain actions of private parties and often apply the same legal 
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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States,212 an estate tax 
case discussed briefly below, generally have not been asserted; and 
where attempted, have not been successful. However, efforts to 
implement an initial favorable ruling in Manufacturers Hanover 
ultimately led to significant changes in related governmental 
policies. 213 
In the initial ruling in Manufacturers Hanover, the federal 
district court in 1983 held that use of gender-based actuarial 
tables, required by the federal taxing authorities to determine for 
estate tax purposes the present value of a reversionary interest in 
the trust of a decedent, constituted impermissible sex 
discrimination in deprivation of due process of law guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment. 214 Shortly after the district court issued its 
decision, the Treasury issued proposed revised regulations, which 
eliminated the sex-based distinction in actuarial tables used for 
valuing annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders, and 
reversions for purposes of federal income, estate, and gift 
taxation.215 Because the unisex regulations proposed changing the 
rule prospectively,216 however, they did not resolve the pending 
estate tax refund case. 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the decedent's 
executor.217 The majority opinion disagreed with the district 
court's constitutional analysis; it held instead that the use of sex-
distinct actuarial tables could be justified by the Internal Revenue 
Service under the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to sex-
based classifications "as substantially related to important 
standards to race and sex discrimination. See infra note 250 and accompanying text 
("[R]ace and sex distinctions stand on the same footing under the Civil Rights Act."). 
212 576 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd 75 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1985). 
213 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (noting that unisex tax regulations went 
into effect and that the federal government also adopted unisex mortality tables for certain 
other purposes). 
214 Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 837, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(relating to a refund claim for over $458,000 in estate taxes and additions to tax). 
215 See Revision of Actuarial Tables and Interest Factors, 48 Fed. Reg. 50,087-50,111 (Oct. 
31, 1983) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11, 20, 25) (issuing proposed regulations that 
eliminated sex-based distinctions prospectively but left gender-based tables applicable to 
estates of persons dying before, or valuations effective before, November 30, 1983). 
216 Id. at 50,087. 
211 Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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governmental objectives."218 The court concluded that defining the 
value in terms of average sex-based life expectancies,219 rather 
than in terms of individualized estimation of life expectancy, 
provided more accurate valuation of a "special kind of average 
value of reversionary interests"220 for estate tax purposes and thus 
did not constitute invidious discrimination.221 
Despite the Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's 
constitutional determination, finalized prospective unisex tax 
regulations went into effect.222 In addition to the revised tax 
regulations providing unisex mortality tables for purposes of 
computing reversionary interests for estate tax purposes, the 
federal government adopted unisex mortality tables for certain 
employee pension computations,223 and for a number of other tax 
21s Id. at 464 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). The court emphasized that 
the Constitution, unlike Title VII, does not give sex discrimination the same level of 
scrutiny it gives to race discrimination. Id. at 468. 
219 Id. at 465 (quoting Memorandum from IRS Commissioner Randolph Thrower to Edwin 
S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) (explaining that the government adopted the 
use of sex-based tables to compute the value of reversionary interests in 1970 "in the 
interest of greater actuarial accuracy''). The Treasury had previously used unisex tables. 
See, e.g., Regulations Relating to Estate Tax, 17 Fed. Reg. 5016, 5017 (Dep't of Treas. June 
4, 1952) (miscellaneous amendments). 
220 Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 775 F.2d at 469. 
221 Id. at 465-66. 
222 Revision of Actuarial Tables and Interest Factors, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,973 (May 11, 1984) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11, 20, 23) (''The regulations [were] generally effective for 
transfers occurring after November 30, 1983."); see also I.R.C. § 7520(c)(3) (1988) (requiring 
revision of tables for valuation purposes "not less frequently than once each 10 years" to 
take into account recent mortality experience available at the time of revision); Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2031-7A (2013) (providing current unisex tables). The 1983 Unisex Mortality tables 
promulgated by the Treasury and the IRS, according to a study published in 2001, was a 
weighted average of the 1983 mortality tables for men and women published by the Society 
of Actuaries, with different weights at different ages. See JEFFREY R. BROWN ET AL., THE 
ROLE OF ANNUITY MARKETS IN FINANCING RETIREMENT 192, tbl. 7.1 (2001) (citing 1983 lAM 
from Society of Actuaries, Transactions, Volume XXXIII). After the study authors "reverse 
engineered" the IRS tables, they found that the weighted averages used by the IRS varied 
with age and placed heavier emphasis on female than male mortality. Id. at 193. Although 
the Treasury has revised the mortality tables used to value the benefits of group life 
insurance and certain other insurance products, the authors noted that the tables used to 
compute the taxable income from payments made tinder single-premium annuities had 
remained unchanged since 1986. Id. 
223 For example, concern about implementation of court rulings under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, as amended, contributed to related changes from sex-based to unisex mortality 
tables used to compute statutory limitations applicable to qualified pension plans. See, e.g., 
Rev. Ru!. 95-6, 1995-1 C.B. 80, 80 (1995) (citing Arizona v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983)) 
(specifying that a unisex group annuity table, based upon a fixed blend of half of the male 
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purposes, including the income taxation of life annuity payments 
received under private commercial insurance contracts.224 
Following these federal regulatory changes, some states adopted 
unisex mortality tables for state tax or probate purposes, relying 
on the federal tables as a model.225 Thus, during this period, both 
federal and state governmental authorities extended the principle 
of sex-neutral classification beyond the employment context, 
mortality rates and half of the female mortality rates, be used for purposes of adjusting 
benefits or limitations and determining the present value of plan benefits under federal tax 
provisions), superseded by Rev. Rul. 2001-62, 2001-2 C.B. 632, 633 (2001) (citing Norris in 
adopting an updated unisex group annuity table for distributions with annuity starting 
dates after 2002), modified by Rev. Rul. 2007-67, 2007-2 C.B. 1047-48 (2007) (citing Norris 
and adopting an updated unisex table for plan years beginning in 2008). 
224 Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1995) (including unisex mortality tables used to compute the 
income tax on payments received under life annuity contract investments made after June 
30, 1986, but permitting the use of gender-based tables for annuity contract investments 
made prior to July 1, 1986); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.101-7 (1989) (cross-referencing Reg. 
§ 1. 72-9 unisex mortality tables for computation of income tax on lifetime payout option for 
life insurance proceeds to beneficiaries for deaths occurring after October 22, 1986). 
Those unisex tables were promulgated after enactment by Congress of a provision in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, giving the Secretary of the Treasury authority to prescribe 
mortality tables for purposes of certain tax calculations. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-514, § lOOl(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2387 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 101(d)(2)(B)(ii)). Prior law specified the use of insurance company mortality tables for 
purposes of valuing the delayed payment of a nontaxable death benefit. S. REP. No. 99-313, 
at 487 (1986). The Committee reports accompanying the amendment directed the Secretary 
to prescribe gender-neutral tables for that purpose. Id. at 487-88; H.R. REP. No. 99-841, 
vol. II, 338-39 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
Representative Dingell, a former sponsor of the proposed nondiscrimination in 
insurance legislation as well as the amendment to I.R.C. section 101 in the 1986 Act, 
vigorously objected to the portion of the section 72 regulations permitting the continued use 
of gender-based tables for investment in contracts made prior to the effective date of the 
Act. While Dingell urged a broader application of the unisex principle to future payouts 
under earlier investments, he also praised the Treasury for having "gender-neutralized 
some 30 of its previous gender-discriminatory regulations" over the previous three years. 
Letter from John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Commerce Comm. to James A. Baker 
III, Sec'y of the Treasury (Feb. 27, 1987) (on file at Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute 
for Advanced Study, Harvard University, NOW LDEF Collection, MC 623, Box 125, No. 11). 
225 See Estate of Kamen, 607 N.W.2d 32, 40 (S.D. 2000) (affirming the trial court's use of 
unisex mortality tables, as adopted for federal estate tax and other purposes, for 
determining the present value of a family trust used to satisfy surviving spouse's elective 
share entitlement). But see Estate of Darrin v. Dir. of the Div. of Taxation, 557 A.2d 677, 
680 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (reversing and remanding determination by tax court 
that gender-based mortality tables were unconstitutional); on remand, 11 N.J. Tax 482, 496 
(1991) (concluding that equal protection was not violated by the use of gender-based 
mortality tables to value life estates in determining transfer inheritance tax liability). 
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discussed below, to include certain governmental valuation 
practices based on life expectancies.22s 
C. FEDERAL LITIGATION 
Although the opponents of gender or race-based rate 
distinctions generally acknowledge that overall mortality or 
morbidity experience of policyholders, among other factors, helps 
determine insurance company overall cost of coverage, they argue 
that the industry should be prohibited from using invidious race or 
gender classifications to allocate individual policyholders' share of 
those costs.227 They point to the civil rights principle that 
statistical generalizations about traditionally discriminated 
against groups should not be used to determine the opportunities 
available to or consequences for an individual member of that 
group-that is, to determine the rates or benefits for individual 
policyholders. 228 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
applied that civil rights principle to prohibit employers from using 
gender-based classifications to determine individual employee 
pension or retirement annuity contributions229 or benefits.23° The 
Court held in the landmark City of Los Angeles Department of 
Water & Power v. Manhart case that the use of sex-segregated 
actuarial tables to calculate pension contributions violates Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whether or not the tables 
226 For discussion of private law approaches to life expectancies and the computation of 
damages in the personal injury context, see generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. 
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (arguing that 
women and minorities have been undercompensated in tort law and that traditional biases 
have resurfaced in updated forms to perpetuate past patterns). 
227 See generally, e.g., Abraham, supra note 26, at 450 ("Where more generalized efforts at 
redistribution of a particular risk, however, have occurred-by eliminating sexual or racial 
discrimination at large, for instance-·asking the holders of specialized forms of insurance 
coverage to bear their share of the cost of this effort is much less problematic."). 
228 See Brilmayer et al., supra note 32, at 505, 509 (arguing that use of sex-based actuarial 
tables to calculate rates or benefits violates the civil rights principle of equal treatment of 
individuals rather than groups). 
229 City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). 
2ao Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1074-75 (1983) (holding that the employer violated Title VII by providing 
employees with the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several commercial 
companies selected by the employer, all of which paid lower monthly retirement benefits to 
a woman than to a man who made the same contributions). 
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reflect an accurate prediction of the longevity of women as a 
class.231 Under the statute, "[e]ven a true generalization about the 
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to 
whom the generalization does not apply."232 The Court explained 
that "[p]ractices that classify employees in terms of religion, race, 
or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups 
rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals."233 
The employer in Manhart had argued that the different 
contributions required from men and women were based on 
longevity and not sex.234 It pointed out that women as a group 
tend to live longer than the average group of men; thus, it would 
cost it more to provide lifetime pension benefits for women.235 As a 
result, according to the employer, women should be required to 
contribute more for their benefits.236 Otherwise, men's 
contributions would in part subsidize the benefits to be received by 
women, which the employer considered to be unfair to the men in 
the plan. 237 
The Court rejected that argument, and held that individual 
women employees could not be required to contribute more--
resulting in women employees receiving a lower take-home pay 
than men-for equal periodic benefits during retirement. 238 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained as follows: 
For when insurance risks are grouped, the better risks 
always subsidize the poorer risks. Healthy persons 
231 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 715. 
232 Id. at 708-09 (stating also that "the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus 
on fairness to individuals, rather than fairness to classes"). The Court pointed out that 
many women do not live as long as the average man, and many men outlive the average 
woman; thus, many of those individuals who have worked for the employer will not live as 
long as the average man but will have received smaller paychecks because of their sex, with 
no compensating advantage when they retire. Id. 
233 Id. at 709. The Court noted that "[s]eparate mortality tables are easily interp,reted as 
reflecting innate differences between the sexes," but that a significant part of the mortality 
differential may be explained by social behavioral factors, like smoking. Id. at 709-10. 
234 Id. at 712. 
235 Id. at 704, 716. 
23s Id. 
237 Id. at 708-09. 
238 See id. at 705 (noting a female employee's monthly contribution to the pension fund 
was approximately fifteen percent higher than the contributions required of a comparable 
male employee, and at retirement, the monthly benefits were equal for men and women of 
the same age, seniority, and salary). 
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subsidize medical benefits for the less healthy; 
unmarried workers subsidize the pensions of married 
workers; persons who eat, drink, or smoke to excess 
may subsidize pension benefits for persons whose 
habits are more temperate. Treating different classes 
of risks as though they were the same for purposes of 
group insurance is a common practice that has never 
been considered inherently unfair. To insure the 
flabby and the fit as though they were equivalent risks 
may be more common than treating men and women 
alike; but nothing more than habit makes one 
"subsidy" seem less fair than the other.239 
45 
As Justice Stevens pointed out, the employment benefits at 
issue involved employee groups where cross subsidization may be 
more common.24° Five years later, in Arizona Governing 
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation 
Plans u. Norris, the Court extended the nondiscrimination 
principle outlined in Manhart to prohibit the payment by an 
insurance company of unequal periodic retirement benefits to men 
and women under a payout option provided by the employer under 
its retirement plan.241 Unlike the employee benefit plan involved 
in Manhart, the employees in Norris made equal contributions to 
the employer's group annuity plan during their working years.242 
The Court held in Norris that lower periodic payments made to 
retired women under an annuity payout option violated Title VII, 
and required the equalization of payouts made to future retirees 
under the plan. 243 
After the Court's decision in Norris, the insurance industry 
quickly responded by supplementing the new 1980 CSO mortality 
239 Id. at 710 (footnotes omitted). 
240 Id. 
241 Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity·& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1094 (1983). 
242 Id. at 1106 (noting that men and women made equal contributions). 
243 Id. at 1097; see also, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc., 735 F.2d 23, 27-29 
(2d Cir. 1984) (applying Norris to retirement annuity benefits provided to employees of 
colleges and universities by the Teacher's Insurance and Annuity Association and College 
Retirement Equity Fund and upholding the district court's pre-Norris ruling that male and 
female employees retiring after the effective date of its judgment in 1980 receive equal 
periodic annuity payments). 
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tables with gender-merged (blended) tables to permit pension-
related insurance policies to equalize nonforfeiture benefits and 
cash values for men and women.244 In 1983, the NAIC approved 
the gender-blended mortality tables for inclusion in its model laws 
and regulations as an option for those purposes,245 and many 
states subsequently adopted NAIC's model regulations.246 Later 
model provisions adopted by the NAIC, which reference updated 
2001 CSO mortality tables, contain a similar gender-blended 
option.247 
244 See discussion supra Part Ill.A. 
24& The NAIC Executive Committee initially approved an interim procedure in the fall of 
1983, followed by a finalized procedure, which included specific supplemental tables 
recommended by NAIC's Life Insurance Committee, and adopted by the NAIC, effective 
retroactive to the effective date of Norris. See NAIC Procedure for Permitting Same 
Nonforfeiture Standards for Men and Women Insured Under 1980 CSO and 1980 GET 
Mortality Tables, NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-811.pdf. 
The preamble to the procedure stated that "[a]lthough there is some uncertainty as to the 
breadth of the Supreme Court's decision, it would seem to require that after August 1, 1983, 
employer pension[s] ... may need to be funded by life insurance products that have 
identical nonforfeiture values for men and women." Id. Under the model procedure, no 
attempt was made to define which policies and situations were covered by Norris. Id. 
However, the preamble explained that because the scope of the Norris decision "may 
ultimately have to be resolved by further court decisions or federal legislation," insurers 
were given the flexibility under the procedure to use either the 1980 gender-distinct tables 
or a range of gender-merged tables. Id. Nevertheless, the drafting comments made clear 
that the reason for the model procedure was to facilitate compliance with Norris since the 
gender-distinct 1980 CSO Mortality Tables made it "very difficult if not impossible" for 
companies to determine actual nonforfeiture values that "are identical for men and women 
and also satisfy a sex-differentiated minimum standard." Id.; see also Proceedings of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Life Insurance Committee Meeting, 1984-
4 NAIC PROC. 374, Attachment Two-Al (1983) (stating that the new procedures had been 
adopted on an interim basis); Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, Executive Committee Meeting, 1984-4 NAIC PROC. 29 (1983) (adopting the 
Life Insurance Committee's report and minutes of meeting at which the interim measures 
were adopted); Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Plenary 
Session III, 1983 Winter Annual Meeting, 1984-4 NAIC PROC. 5 (1983) (adopting the 
Executive Committee's report). At about this time, the NAIC also approved the smoker and 
nonsmoker tables as supplements to the 1980 CSO tables for use in determining minimum 
reserve liabilities and nonforfeiture benefits. Id. at Attachment Two-A4, AS. 
246 E.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-74-200 (2014) (adopting NAIC model regulations in 
1988); see also NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines § 811-1, State Adoption 
(2012) (listing all the states that have adopted NAIC's model regulations). 
247 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2002-3 NAIC PROC. 
985 (2002). When the 1980 CSO Mortality Tables were updated by the 2001 CSO Mortality 
Tables, some members of the NAIC's Life and Health Actuarial Task Force urged that 
limitations be placed on gender-blended mortality tables by restricting their use beyond the 
scope of the decision in Norris. Id. In response to those concerns, but without referring to 
Norris, the task force included the following language in the proposed new model provisions: 
2014] NONDISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE 47 
Those opposed to gender-neutral rates outside of employer 
group insurance maintain that additional issues related to 
selection of individual insurance coverage by members of groups 
most likely to benefit from the cross subsidization could result in 
pricing problems or in greater market segmentation and coverage 
limitations.248 As over a century of experience with race-based 
rates in private markets for individual life insurance has shown, 
some sort of unified national response or unified industry action, 
or both, was required before lasting change could be achieved in 
those individual insurance markets.249 
As the Supreme Court noted in Norris, "if it would be unlawful 
to use race-based actuarial tables, it must also be unlawful to use 
sex-based tables," because race and sex distinctions stand on the 
same footing under the Civil Rights Act.250 Outside of Title VII 
law, however, commercial insurance companies and many state 
For any ordinary life insurance policy delivered or issued for delivery in 
this state on and after January 1, 200[J ... , that utilizes the same 
premium rates and charges for male and female lives or is issued in 
circumstances where applicable law does not permit distinctions on the 
basis of gender, a mortality table that is a blend of the 2001 CSO Mortality 
Table (M) and the 2001 CSO Mortality Table (F) may, at the option of the 
company for each plan of insurance, be substituted for the 2001 CSO 
Mortality Table for use in determining minimum cash surrender values 
and amounts of paid-up nonforfeiture benefits. 
Id. For the final version of the model regulation, see NAIC Model Laws, Regulations, and 
Guidelines, NAT'L AsS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-814.pdf, http:// 
www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-815.pdf. 
248 See generally, e.g., Abraham, supra note 26, at 445-51 (discussing ways that reform of 
suspect insurance risk classifications may be undermined by market forces that could result 
in much less cross-subsidization than the modified system had originally envisioned, 
leading to pricing and coverage issues for those remaining in the risk pool). The issue of 
adverse selection is less understood empirically than sometimes recognized or 
acknowledged in policy debates. For a survey and discussion of recent studies of adverse 
selection in various markets for insurance, the difficulty of disentangling the coverage-risk 
correlation resulting from adverse selection and moral hazard, and a detailed discussion of 
possible reasons for the puzzling negative cost-risk correlation (that is, a lack of evidence of 
selection by greater risks) for life insurance, but positive correlation for life annuities, see 
Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 29, at 57-60, 62-77. 
249 As previously discussed, see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text, elimination of 
race-based insurance rates took over a century to accomplish. Although some states 
enacted laws banning race discrimination in life insurance as far back as the 1880s, reforms 
in those states tended to drive such business elsewhere and resulted in the creation ofrace-
segmented markets. Reen, supra note 40, at 397-99. 
2so Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983). 
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policymakers and regulators did not place gender and race on the 
same footing. 251 
D. STATE LAW REFORM EFFORTS 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it became clear that 
ratification of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) might 
not be attained within the time limits set by Congress,252 women's 
rights groups pursued multi-pronged challenges to discriminatory 
insurance practices under state equal rights amendments as well 
as under existing state and federal civil rights statutes.253 At the 
same time, they continued to push for comprehensive federal 
legislation banning sex-based insurance practices.254 
251 See discussion supra Part IIl.B; infra Parts III.D (discussing the response to reform 
efforts outside of the Title VII context). 
252 E.g., Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of 
Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2059-60 (2000) (discussing the factors leading to failure of ERA 
ratification during the set timetable); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal 
Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV. 919, 928--29 (1979) (describing the 
vote by Congress in 1978, to extend the original 1979 deadline until June 30, 1982). 
Ratification of the ERA failed when only thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states 
approved it by 1982. See Kay, supra, at 2064. 
253 For example, the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) announced a "two-pronged 
strategy on the issue of unisex insurance legislation," with work at both the national and 
the state levels: 
In conjunction with BPW [Business and Professional Women's Clubs], 
WEAL is planning a survey of the states to determine what is happening in 
each in the area of unisex insurance legislation and also to find examples of 
individual women who have been discriminated against by the insurance 
industry. WEAL and BPW are combining efforts to put together an 
insurance packet, available to all interested groups, to include: testimony, 
sample legislation, strategy for action, "the good guys and the bad guys," 
regional and national contacts, networking strategy, recent reports and 
facts, etc. 
WEAL Insurance Discrimination Kit, Unisex Insurance (Mar. 30, 1985) (on file at 
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University, WEAL 
collection, Carton 78, #2). 
254 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Rights, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1952 (1991) (discussing the Women's Rights Project's continued 
litigation and legislation-support efforts following Congress's failure to ratify the ERA); see 
also, e.g., Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearing on S. 2204 Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 97th Cong. 72, 77 (1982) (statement of bill sponsor Sen. Bob 
Packwood, Chair of the Comm., in agreement with the statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler, 
Director, ACLU Women's Rights Project, that "[i]n the wake of the expiration of the 
ratification period for the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, this bill presents a 
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State equal rights amendments provided an alternative ground 
for eliminating the sex-based risk classifications utilized by the 
insurance industry.255 By the early 1980s, some states prohibited 
sex-based auto insurance rates by statute;256 however, no state 
prior to 1983 prohibited sex-based rates or benefits for life 
insurance.257 By the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, women's rights 
organizations turned their attention from passing proposed federal 
insurance non-discrimination legislation to achieving incremental 
gains in key states through legislative advocacy and litigation.258 
tremendous opportunity and challenge to those who opposed the ERA but claim to favor 
equal rights without a constitutional amendment"). 
255 A NOW Insurance Resolution, adopted by the National Conference of the National 
Organization for Women in October 1982, provided as follows: 
RESOLVED that the National Organization for Women will mount a major 
campaign to outlaw all sex discrimination in insurance as part of a 
comprehensive action plan for economic empowerment for women. The 
campaign will focus efforts and public attention through specific legal and 
regulatory challenges based on state ERAs, fair trade acts, and other anti-
discriminatory statutes. Such challenges will form bases to inform and 
involve activists and the public through mass demonstrations and the 
application of economic and political pressures. 
1982 Conference Resolutions: NOW Insurance Resolution, NAT'L NOW TIMES, Oct. 1982 
(available on microfilm at Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, 
Harvard University); see also, e.g., Clara Germani, Industry Fights Back Against Campaign 
for 'Unisex' Insurance Rates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 14, 1983, http://www.csmonit 
or.com/1983/061430.html (reporting that major industry trade groups viewed the campaign 
for unisex insurance as "one of the biggest challenges ever to its actuarial foundations" and 
that NOW in the past week had staged demonstrations over the issue in twenty-five cities). 
256 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-207 (2013); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 175E, § 4(d) (2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS§ 500.2027 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 58-3-25(a) (2013). Since then, according 
to a recent study, those states have been joined by a handful of other states in prohibiting 
(by statute or regulation) gender discrimination in auto insurance rates. Avraham et al., 
supra note 14, at 245. 
257 See Avraham et al., supra note 14, at 246, 250 & n.142 (stating that as of 2012 
Montana was the only state to prohibit sex-based life insurance rates); see infra Part III.D.2 
(discussing Montana's insurance non-discrimination statute enacted in 1983, with a 1985 
effective date). 
258 See, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Unisex-Insurance Proponents Wage Guerrilla Warfare in 
States, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1985, at Business 63 ("Rob Bier of the American Council of Life 
Insurance says that if unisex pricing prevails in a populous state like Massachusetts, 
California or New York, it might force the companies to adopt at least part of that pricing, 
on some products, nationwide."); NOW Suit Alleges Mutual of Omaha Overcharges Women, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1984, at 31 (quoting NOW President Judy Goldsmith as saying, "If the 
insurers thought they had won when they poured millions of dollars into a successful 
lobbying campaign to gut the Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act, they were wrong," 
referring to House action on the measure). 
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1. State Regulatory Reforms and Litigation Under State ERAs. 
In a few states, including Pennsylvania, reform-minded insurance 
commissioners relied on their general supervisory authority under 
state insurance law to disapprove sex-based auto insurance rates 
or benefits.259 In 1984, the Supreme Court for the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania upheld the insurance commissioner's actions as 
an appropriate exercise of his statutory authority given the state's 
strict policy against sex discrimination evidenced by the state's 
Equal Rights Amendment.260 After the Pennsylvania ruling, 
women's rights groups expressed the hope that sex-based auto 
insurance rates would be eliminated in all fifteen states with state 
equal rights amendments.261 
However, the insurance industry successfully blocked a broader 
regulatory movement toward unisex insurance rates. The hope 
that state equal rights amendments would provide additional 
impetus for reform soon waned when state courts, including the 
highest court in Massachusetts in Telles v. Commissioner of 
Insurance,262 issued opinions invalidating unisex regulations and 
25s See also, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office v. Comm'r of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515, 517 (La. Ct. App. 
1979) (invalidating the cease and desist order issued by Louisiana's Commissioner of 
Insurance requiring auto insurers to discontinue their use of sex-based rates and 
interpreting the insurance statute, which prohibits "unfair discrimination," to permit 
classifications based on age and sex when statistically sound); Wayne King, Trenton Giues 
Rate Details for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at Bl (describing regulations issued 
by the Insurance Commissioner banning sex-based auto insurance rates and adopting new 
rate-setting procedures to be phased in over two years but noting that they had "generated 
a storm of protest from insurers," and that Republicans, with "veto-proof majorities in both 
houses," had proposed a bill that would ''return to insurers the power to determine the 
factors that they use in predicting which drivers are most likely and least likely to have 
accidents"). 
2so Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r of Commonwealth, 482 A.2d 542, 549 
(Pa. 1984). 
261 See Pennsylvania court disallows sex-based auto insurance rates under state Equal 
Rights Amendment, From the State Capitals, Insurance Regulation 3-4 (Nov. 5, 1984) 
(noting that a spokesperson from the Legal Defense and Education Fund of the National 
Organization for Women told them "that the Pennsylvania ruling probably will prompt 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of sex-based auto insurance rates in the 15 other 
states that have equal rights amendments," including "Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming," and reporting that four states had already 
outlawed such rates as not based on equal rights laws, including ''Hawaii, North Carolina, 
Massachusetts and Michigan"); Equal Rights Ruling for Auto Insurance Expected to Spread, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1984, at A18. 
2s2 574 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Mass. 1991). 
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upholding the industry's continued use of sex-based distinctions in 
life insurance263 as well as in other types of insurance, including 
auto insurance.264 
Telles invalidated regulations issued in 1987 by the 
Massachusetts insurance commissioner that broadly prohibited 
insurers from utilizing certain discriminatory classifications, 
including sex and marital status,265 with respect to policy 
"availability, terms, conditions, rates, benefits or requirements."266 
Several major life insurance companies and individual purchasers 
of life insurance immediately sought a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin implementation of the unisex regulations before they were 
to become effective in 1988. 267 Although the regulations were 
initially upheld as within the commissioner's implicit authority 
derived from the state's equal rights amendment, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts on appeal reversed the judgment 
below and rejected the commissioner's authority to issue the 
regulations.268 
The court first held that the commissioner's regulations 
conflicted with several state insurance statutes.269 In the 
majority's view, the state insurance law's prohibition against 
"unfair discrimination" meant discrimination among insureds of 
the same class based on something other than actuarial risk; thus, 
according to the court, the statute permitted discrimination 
supported by differences in actuarial risk.270 In addition, the court 
found that the regulations directly conflicted with a statute 
requiring that premiums of ordinary insurance be calculated on 
20a Id. 
264 State Dep't of Ins. v. Ins. Serva. Office, 434 So. 2d 908, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that the insurance department had no authority to prohibit auto insurers from 
charging rates on the basis of sex if those rating factors were found to be actuarially sound). 
205 The regulations prohibited classification based on race, color, religion, sex, marital status, 
or national origin. Telles, 574 N.E.2d at 361(citing211 MAss. CODE REG.§ 35.04(1) (1987)). 
20s Id. (quoting 211 MASS. CODE REG. § 35.04(2) (1987)). 
267 Id. at 361; Insurance: Equal Rates for Both Sexes, TIME (June 1, 1987), http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,964516,00.html (noting that Massachusetts Insurance 
Commissioner Peter Hiam, ordered firms to comply by July 1988, and reporting that although 
many insurance executives opposed the Commissioner's involvement in rate setting, the John 
Hancock lobbyist supported the Commissioner's action, saying that "[c]urrent rates 
discriminate against the individual'). 
20s Telles, 574 N.E.2d at 363. 
269 Id. at 361-62. 
210 Id. 
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the basis of the Commissioner's 1980 Standard Ordinary Mortality 
Table, which utilized gender-based mortality classes.271 Finally, 
the court concluded that the commissioner had no implicit 
authority under the Equal Rights Amendment of the 
Massachusetts Constitution to regulate underwriting practices in 
regard to gender.272 In sum, the court determined that the 
insurance "commissioner lacked either express or implied 
authority to promulgate the regulations."273 
Back in Pennsylvania, following judicial approval of the 
insurance commissioner's regulatory authority to ban sex-based 
auto insurance rates, the casualty insurance industry successfully 
lobbied the legislature to enact legislation expressly permitting 
such rates. 274 Enacted in 1986, the legislation authorized sex-
based auto insurance rates (but not rates based on race, religion, 
or national origin) if "supported by sound actuarial principles" or 
"related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience."215 When 
challenged by parents of a male teenage driver and the League of 
Women Voters of Pennsylvania, however, the statute was 
invalidated as unconstitutional under the state Equal Rights 
Amendment, and the insurance commissioner was enjoined from 
enforcing the statute.276 On appeal, the lower court's order was 
affirmed without opinion by an equally divided state Supreme 
Court.277 
271 Id. at 362. The concurring opinion would have rested its analysis solely on this ground. 
It was critical of the majority's "conclusory and unnecessary determination" that actuarial 
soundness automatically translates into "fair" discrimination and was apparently 
discomforted by the implications of that analysis for race-based risk classifications. Id. at 363 
n.l. In addition, according to the concurrence, the Insurance Commissioner should have 
instead sought a declaratory judgment if he believed that the use of gender-based mortality 
tables violated the Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 363-64. 
272 Id. at 363. 
21s Id. 
274 See Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act of 1986, P.L. 80, No. 27 (codified as 
amended 40 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 1183(e) (West 2014). 
215 Id. 
276 See Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 397-98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (concluding 
that "[t]he ability to operate a motor vehicle [was] not a physical characteristic uniquely 
related to one's sex," the only type of sexual discrimination permitted under the state Equal 
Rights Amendment, and rejecting sex-based insurance rates under that standard even if 
actuarially sound). 
211 Bartholomew v. Foster, 563 A.2d 1390, 1390 (1989) (per curiam). 
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Although the constitutional principle hel~, the politics had 
changed. The political momentum behind the regulatory 
innovations stalled as the industry fiercely fought change at both 
the federal and state levels. In some states, the legislature 
overturned the regulatory changes. As a result, the women's 
organizations were unable to build nationally on early regulatory 
successes within key states . 
. Women's rights groups also challenged the continuing use of 
sex-distinct insurance rates and benefits278 under existing state 
human rights and public accommodation statutes.279 Although the 
women's groups achieved some initial successes before state 
administrative agencies and at the trial court level, the insurance 
industry later succeeded in persuading appellate courts that such 
state laws were inapplicable to sex-based insurance rates,280 and 
278 For a successful state law challenge to sex-based denial of access to fraternal benefits, 
see Franklin v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 590 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Mass. 
1984) (holding a fraternal benefit society in violation of a state statutory ban on sex 
discrimination when it denied the female plaintiff membership and insurance coverage not 
otherwise available to police force members through their municipal employer). 
219 E.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (prohibiting any place of public 
accommodation from denying any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges 
thereof on the basis of, among other things, a person's sex); see also D.C. CODE§ 2-1401.02(24) 
(2014) (defining an insurance company as a "place of public accommodation'). 
280 Nat'! Org. for Women v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.Y.S.2d 934, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987) (reversing the trial court and dismissing the challenge to sex-based rates or benefits 
in life insurance and disability insurance); Thompson v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 549 P.2d 510, 
513-14 (Or. 1976) (holding that sex-based rates could not be challenged under public 
accommodation statute because regulation of unfair discrimination in the business of 
insurance fell within the domain of the insurance commissioner); see also Nancy L. Ross, 
Women's Groups Dealt Setback on Insurance, WASH. POST, June 25, 1987, at Fl (reporting 
on appellate court in New York overturning trial court ruling in $21 million class action 
against Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.). But see Ins. Comm'r v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc'y of the U.S., 664 A.2d 862, 865, 873, 882 (Md. 1995) (discussing determinations below 
of Human Relations Commission and Insurance Commissioner that sex-based life insurance 
rates were inconsistent with the state Equal Rights Amendment, acknowledging relevance 
of human rights law, and remanding for further determinations by the Insurance 
Commissioner regarding applicable insurance law). Maryland's Commission on Human 
Relations began an investigation of Equitable Life in 1975 and thereafter issued a written 
finding that Equitable Life discriminated against blacks and females with respect to 
disability income, and health and life insurance policies. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of 
the U.S. v. State of Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 430 A.2d 60, 61 (Md. 1981). The 
Commission next filed a statement of charges alleging various counts of discrimination in 
rate setting and underwriting practices. Id. Equitable Life filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting the Commission's lack of jurisdiction, on the grounds that the practices placed in 
issue in the statement of charges were already subject to regulation by the Insurance 
Commissioner, and that Equitable Life was in full compliance with those regulations. Id. at 
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that if sex-based rates were actuarially justified, they were valid 
under state insurance laws.281 
2. State Legislation Banning Sex-Based Life Insurance Rates or 
Benefits. Women's groups achieved an important state legislative 
success at the same time that they worked for legislation at the 
federal level.282 Montana, another state with· an Equal Rights 
Amendment,283 was the first and only state to enact a statute 
banning sex-based rates and benefits for all types of insurance.284 
The insurance industry, including life insurance companies and 
industry trade organizations, actively lobbied against the 
legislation,285 which was supported by key women's, civil rights, 
and labor groups within the state.286 
61, 64, 66 (affirming ruling against insurance company below and holding that the 
Commission had jurisdiction to investigate discrimination in underwriting practices under 
public accommodations law despite concurrent regulation of insurance by insurance 
commissioner). 
281 Nat'l Org. for Women v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 274, 276 (D.C. 1987) 
(affirming the dismissal of a challenge under D.C. human rights law of sex-based rates for 
health insurance as a violation of provisions requiring nondiscrimination in places of public 
accommodation). 
282 For discussion of proposed federal legislation, see supra Part III.A. 
283 MT. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
284 MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (2013); supra note 257; see, e.g., Nick Ravo, Hartford 
Weighs Insurance Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1988, at 33 (reporting that in the previous 
year legislatures in twelve states had considered "unisex" insurance bills, that none 
advanced beyond initial hearings, and that proposed unisex legislation was opposed in 
Connecticut by the insurance industry). 
285 Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee, Jan. 28, 1983, Hearing on House Bill 358, 
at 10-11 and attached exhibits (Jan. 28, 1983) (listing the Northwestern Life Insurance 
Company, Montana Association of Life Underwriters, Independent Insurance Agents/ 
Association of Montana, American Council of Life Insurance, American Insurance 
Association and the Health Association of America as well as the Chief Deputy 
Commissioner of Insurance for the state Auditor's Office Insurance Division, as opponents 
of the proposed legislation); see also Minutes of the Senate Business and Industry 
Committee, Hearing on House Bill 358, 1-5 and attached exhibits (Mar. 19, 1983). 
286 Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee, Hearing on House Bill 358, at 9-10 and 
attached exhibits (Jan. 28, 1983) (listing the Women's Lobbyist Fund, the Montana League 
of Women Voters, American Association of University Women, the Montana Federation of 
Business and Professional Women's Club, the Montana Senior Citizen's Association, the 
National Organization for Women, the Montana Education Association, Montana 
Federation of Teachers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Associated Students of 
the University of Montana as supporters of H.358 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sex or marital status in the issuance or operation of insurance policies and retirement 
plans); see also Minutes of the Senate Business and Industry Committee, Hearing on House 
Bill 358, 1-5 and attached exhibits (Mar. 19, 1983). 
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After the legislation was enacted in 1983, insurance companies 
engaged in a renewed lobbying effort to repeal it before it could go 
into effect in 1985.287 Some life insurers threatened to withdraw 
their business from the state.288 Although the industry 
successfully lobbied the Montana Legislature to repeal the unisex 
insurance provisions, the Governor vetoed the bill.289 Since then, 
there have been periodic efforts to repeal the unisex insurance 
statute.290 Nevertheless, the Montana unisex law remains in 
effect, and life insurers and members of the public generally 
appear to have adjusted to its requirements.291 
E. LESSONSLEARNED 
As the history of past reform efforts shows, threats by insurance 
companies to seek business opportunities in those states or 
markets without nondiscrimination prov1s10ns can make it 
politically difficult for state legislators and regulators to change 
industry pricing practices on their own. Even if those political 
obstacles can be overcome, state-by-state or market-by-market 
variation creates problems, including potential cost issues caused 
by a targeted selection of nondiscriminatory products by higher 
287 See Ross, supra note 280 (discussing the fight to repeal the legislation). 
288 See id. (stating that only one insurer actually withdrew business from Montana). 
289 Jane Fitz Simon, Who Wins with Unisex? Controversial Massachusetts Insurance Law 
May Finally Settle the Argument, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1987 (reporting that earlier in the 
year, "the Montana Legislature voted to repeal the unisex law, but Gov. Ted Schwinden vetoed 
the effort" and that a study conducted by the Montana state insurance department showed 
that prices for life insurance for women did increase after unisex became law, but paybacks to 
women also increased, effectively washing out the price jump, quoting Andrea Bennett, 
Montana commissioner of insurance and state auditor, on the findings as follows: "It was a 
very mixed bag. You can't say women were harmed or men were greatly harmed."). 
290 Avraham et al., supra note 14, at 250 n.142 (citing an online insurance newsletter for 
life and health insurance professionals that reported on an effort to repeal the Montana law 
in 2013, as well as in nearly every legislative session since the law's implementation). 
291 See Ross, supra note 280 (reporting on a survey of major life insurance company rates 
conducted by Montana in 1987 and noting that only one company, Aetna, pulled out of 
Montana and several new companies moved in); see also Anne Brodsky et al., Effects of 
Montana's Non-Gender Law on Whole Life and Term Insurance and Annuities, with 
transmittal letter by Marcia Youngman dated August 31, 1987 (on file at Schlesinger 
Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University, NOW LDEF 
Collection, MC 623, Box 127, #4) (criticizing the state insurance department's study for 
failing to consider the positive benefit to women from increased annuity payouts and 
concluding that the increase in whole life premiums for women was almost completely 
counteracted in the long run by increases in cash values). 
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risk individuals or market segmentation by insurance product. 
Due to competitive pricing pressures, lasting change can occur 
only through uniform legal prohibition or some form of collective 
action by national associations of state insurance regulators and 
insurance industry professionals rather than through voluntary 
action by individual companies or by individual states.292 
Collective action problems, however, make it difficult for the 
industry itself to adopt uniform nondiscrimination requirements. 
A number of factors finally combined to create a political 
consensus for change of race-based life insurance practices and 
ultimately led the industry to adopt race-merged mortality tables 
despite continuing race-correlated mortality differences.293 At the 
time industry groups developed standard race-merged mortality 
tables in the 1960s, the insurance industry had been under 
pressure from civil rights groups for several decades, and political 
momentum was pointing toward the adoption of major civil rights 
reform legislation.294 In addition, the industrial life insurance 
market, where higher "substandard" rates for blacks were most 
commonly found, was shrinking.295 Other more integrated life 
insurance markets, by contrast, were growing and attracting the 
business of the biggest companies formerly active in the industrial 
insurance market.296 Thus, the larger companies within the 
industry supported the prospective changes, and the smaller 
companies that remained in those markets were finally brought 
into compliance through state regulatory enforcement efforts and 
litigation many years later.297 
292 See Abraham, supra note 26, at 408, 446 (discussing competitive pressures, skimming 
"good risks," and the need for some form of collective action for innovation to occur in 
classification systems). 
293 Reen, supra note 40, at 380. 
294 Id. at 369. 
295 Id. at 382. 
296 Id. (noting that the "Big Three" insurance companies had discontinued writing new 
industrial policies by the late 1960s). Recent reports suggest, however, that those trends 
may now be in the process of reversing, as companies experience declining ordinary life 
insurance coverage rates. Leslie Scism, Struggling Life Insurers Seek a Middle-Class 
Revival, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2014, at Al. MetLife, for example, has reportedly once again 
begun selling small individual life policies, with payouts as low as $2,500, decades after 
abandoning that business. Id. 
297 Heen, supra note 40, at 383. 
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Although the life insurance industry had a similar opportunity 
over thirty years ago to adopt a new gender-merged mortality 
table for life insurance, it opted instead to make its use of gender 
distinctions more consistent and pervasive by developing gender-
distinct mortality tables for life insurance as well as for life 
annuities.298 As more women entered the labor force following 
World War II, companies used lower life insurance rates for 
women as a marketing tool299 in an expanding new market for life 
insurers.300 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared that 
both the Equal Rights Amendment ratification effort and proposed 
federal legislation to ban discrimination in insurance would fail in 
the face of determined opposition, and the life insurance industry 
opted to formalize its gender-based pricing practices through the 
development of sex-segregated mortality tables to replace its use of 
age set-backs from the former gender-merged tables.301 
The political momentum for change by then had stalled, making 
it difficult for women's groups to achieve additional legal 
prohibitions against gender-based insurance pricing.302 Although 
comprehensive civil rights legislation banning discrimination in 
insurance is long overdue, enactment seems unlikely without 
298 See supra Part Ill.A (discussing the development of the 1980 C.S.O. mortality tables). 
299 In 1958, for example, the John Hancock named its first woman Second Vice President 
in the company's history, Margaret Divver, formerly the company's advertising manager, to 
serve "in the field of special promotion as head of Women's Activities as they apply to the 
life insurance industry." Press Release, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
News Bureau (Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1958) (on file at Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for 
Advanced Study, Harvard University, Papers of Margaret Divvers, MC 337, Box 1, Folder 
4). As part of her promotional activities, she held all-day women's forums in major cities 
aimed at working women and widows. Mary Fitzhenry, Margaret Divver: Interpreter of 
Insurance, 1 REALM FOR WOMEN OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 58 (Oct. 1963). A magazine profile 
described Divver as "an industry spokesman to the 'slighted' sex, now being sought as a 
market for life insurance," and that the marketing activities were promoted "in the hope 
that agents' sales will catch up with women's earning power." Id. at 56. 
3oo INST. OF LIFE INS., LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 16 (1954) (observing that "[w]hile life 
insurance has been written on the lives of women from the start of the business, it is only in 
the past generation that women have bought policies in any appreciable volume"). The 1954 
Fact Book reports that "[a]t the end of 1953, men owned three-fourths of all life insurance in 
force in the United States" and "[f]rom 1948 to 1953, men increased their ownership 55%; 
women increased theirs 26% and children 42%." Id. Of the aggregate life insurance in force 
owned by women at the end of 1953, women owned $23.8 billion or thirteen percent of total 
regular ordinary insurance, $8.4 billion or twelve percent of total regular group, and $17.3 
billion or forty-six percent of total industrial insurance in force. Id. 
301 See discussion supra Part III.A, B. 
302 See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. 
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renewed political effort by civil rights organizations and women's 
groups. 
Incremental reforms in the United States provide a successful 
although somewhat limited experience with race-merged and 
gender-merged or "unisex" pricing of insurance products. A 
federalized approach to the civil rights principle of individual 
fairness worked very effectively in the context of insurance 
benefits provided by employers.303 After the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that sex-distinct rates or benefits would not be permitted for 
employment-related retirement benefits, for example, employers 
and insurers throughout the country modified their practices in 
the employment setting by using sex-merged mortality tables to 
compute unisex rates and benefits.304 In addition, some states 
have experience with nondiscrimination requirements as applied 
to various types of insurance sold to individuals outside of the 
employment setting.305 Going forward, the experience with unisex 
rates in Europe, as discussed in greater detail in the next part,306 
will provide additional information about implementation issues 
and challenges for insurance provided outside of the employment 
relationship. 
In sum, past efforts at reform, both successful and unsuccessful, 
establish the need for uniformity in the nondiscrimination rules 
applicable to insurers. Both the "public values" question of 
individual fairness and the technical issues related to adverse 
selection can be resolved most successfully if insurers are subject 
to mandatory nondiscrimination rules. However, in the absence of 
voluntary reconsideration of a unisex standard by groups of state 
regulators such as the NAIC and the uniform adoption of unisex 
tables by state regulators, federal legislation is needed to 
eliminate the remaining legal gaps. Comprehensive change will 
require coordinated federal leadership on these issues. 
303 See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
304 See discussion supra Part 111.c. 
3os See discussion supra Part 111.D. 
sos See discussion infra Part IV.c. 
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IV. WHY NONDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION Is TIMELY AGAIN 
Civil rights issues connected with insurance classifications 
could become politically salient again for reasons related to recent 
developments in nondiscrimination law3°7 and the reconsideration 
more generally of approaches to insurance regulation and risk 
sharing.3os Those developments alter the policy landscape and 
background assumptions in a way that could lead to 
comprehensive federal nondiscrimination legislation in the future. 
In addition, current budgetary and demographic pressures309 as 
well as major policy shifts abroad310 may prompt renewed interest 
and increased federal expertise in insurance regulatory issues. 
I discuss those developments in greater detail below, beginning 
first with a brief discussion of current domestic developments that 
could lead to a renewed civil rights focus on these issues. I then 
briefly highlight some evolving regulatory changes here and 
abroad that may prompt a more centralized or coordinated 
response to international developments by the federal government 
or by state regulators of the insurance industry in the United 
States. This part concludes with a description of how the 
European Union developed its unisex insurance mandate during 
the last decade, culminating in a 2011 ruling by the European 
Court of Justice that required member states to conform their laws 
to prohibit gender based pricing in all lines of commercial 
insurance beginning in 2012. 
A. RENEWED FOCUS ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
Congress has moved forward on several longstanding civil 
rights issues in the last several years,311 including the passage of 
307 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
308 See infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text. 
309 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
310 See discussion infra Part IV.c. 
311 After decades of advocacy by civil rights groups, for example, passage of civil rights 
legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation may be 
within reach. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(adding discrimination based on sexual orientation to the list of prohibited employment 
practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The Act, as amended, passed the 
Senate 64--32, nearly twenty years after it was first proposed in 1994. S. REP. No. 113-105, at 
2-5 (2013); U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress-1st Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www. 
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important legislation involving discrimination in insurance. In a 
significant recent development, federal health care reform 
legislation, signed into law in 2010312 and upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2012,313 banned discrimination in health 
insurance coverage,314 and beginning in 2014, prohibits gender 
discrimination in setting certain health insurance rates and 
benefits. 315 The nondiscrimination provisions that Congress 
enacted in conjunction with health care reform, assuming they 
survive ongoing efforts to repeal the legislation, mark a significant 
recent step toward greater acceptance of the nondiscrimination 
principle as applied to gender-distinct insurance rates. 
In adopting these and other requirements for health care 
coverage, Congress applied a hybrid approach to risk sharing. It 
departed in some respects from the approach to risk and cost 
allocation to risk classes typically encountered in private 
insurance markets. On the other hand, it rejected proposals for 
the type of single payer system found in governmental social 
insurance programs in countries with stronger traditions of social 
risk sharing.316 Instead, Congress adopted a modified form of 
senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=113&session=l&vo 
te=00232 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). As of this writing, the House version of the bill, H.R. 
1755, 113th Cong. (2013), has not moved forward to the floor for consideration by the House. 
H.R. 1755- Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congre 
ss.gov/bill/113th-congress/houlse-bill/1755 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). An earlier version of the 
bill passed the House in 2007. H.R. 3685 - Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, 
CONGRESS.GOV, http://www.Congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/3685?q=% 7B"search"% 
3A%SB"Employment+non-discrimination+ act+of+2007''%SD%7D. 
312 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
313 Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). 
314 The PPACA provides that individuals shall not, on grounds prohibited under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age 
Discrimination Act, or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, "any health program or 
activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, 
subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered 
by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments)." 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1557(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2010). 
315 Beginning in 2014, in the individual and small group market, the health reform law 
will eliminate the ability of insurance companies to charge higher rates due to gender. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2010). 
316 See, e.g., Elizabeth Shilton, Insuring Inequality: Sex-Based Mortality Tables and 
Women's Retirement Income, 37 QUEEN'S L.J. 383, 432-34 (2011) (favoring the collective 
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"community rating'' within an overall private market structure,317 
leading to more redistribution than would typically be found in 
private individual health insurance markets.318 It remains to be 
seen whether the broad-based participation needed for that model 
to work well will be achieved as major health care reforms are 
implemented in the coming years. Nevertheless, the legislation 
marks a significant change in approaches to risk sharing and a 
willingness to impose civil rights limitations on insurers. 
Congress also imposed nondiscrimination requirements on the 
insurance industry in 2008 when it enacted the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), banning genetic 
discrimination in health insurance and in employment effective 
beginning in 2009.319 However, GINA defines the term "genetic 
approach taken by post-war Canadian social insurance schemes that distributed welfare 
loss in retirement more broadly across the workforce). 
311 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2010) 
(amending § 2705 of the Public Health Service Act to limit the extent to which insurers can 
vary the rates they charge to customers based on actual or expected health status but 
permitting certain variation by age, family status, tobacco use, and state-approved rating 
areas). 
318 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 117, at 1579-80, 1600-15 ("The act strongly reflects the 
belief that the distribution of health care costs should not depend on Brute Luck." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and the Intimation of 
Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956, 1974-75 (2011) (explaining that opening the 
insurance market to individuals of all health statuses required mandating healthy 
individuals to join insurance markets in order not to kill the private market). 
319 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). GINA prohibits group health plans and 
health insurers from denying coverage to a healthy individual or charging that person 
higher premiums based solely on a genetic predisposition to developing a disease in the 
future. Id. § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3). The legislation also prohibits employers from 
using individuals' genetic information when making employment decisions. Id. § 202, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000ff-1. In enacting GINA, Congress made the following finding: 
Although genes are facially neutral markers, many genetic conditions and 
disorders are associated with particular racial and ethnic groups and 
gender. Because some genetic traits are most prevalent in particular 
groups, members of a particular group may be stigmatized or discriminated 
against as a result of that genetic information. 
Id. § 2, 42 U.S.C. 2000ff note. Over half of the states have enacted similar legislation 
prohibiting or limiting insurers from requiring genetic testing of applicants or from 
requiring the results of tests done independently. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW 
& REGULATION 153-54 (5th ed. 2010). See generally Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information 
Non-Discrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41 (2013) (describing the enactment process, 
implementation since then, and gaps that remain). 
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information" to exclude information about the sex or age of any 
individual,320 leaving many gender-based rating issues unresolved. 
Focus on the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides policymakers with renewed 
opportunities for reflection about nondiscrimination as a matter of 
principle and morality. Debates during the past decade about 
black reparations321 and disclosures at the state level concerning 
slavery era322 insurance practices have generated renewed interest 
in the history of race-based insurance practices.323 Although the 
320 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110·233, 122 Stat. 
881, 885, 890, 898, 901, 906 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
321 E.g., Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1135, 
1135-38 (2004); see, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 
1075 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing plaintiffs' slave reparations claims against various large 
corporations); see generally BORIS I. BI'ITKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (First 
Beacon Press 2003) (1973) (focusing on the effects of then living Afro-Americans who had 
been compelled by state law to attend segregated public schools); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The 
Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 2014) (arguing that America will never be whole 
until it reckons with its compounding moral debts), http://www.theatlantic.com?features/ar 
chive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631. 
322 State laws enacted in the last ten to fifteen years require companies to make certain 
slavery era disclosures, comprising a "slavery era insurance registry," which have been 
summarized in reports compiled by state insurance departments. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Ins., 
Slavery Era Insurance Registry Report to the California Legislature, at 7-8 (May 2002), http:// 
www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/150-other-prog/10-seir/upload/Slavery-Report.pdf 
(reporting, for example, that the predecessor of New York Life began writing policies in 1845; 
of the first thousand policies sold, about a third were on the lives of slaves); Ill. Dep't of Ins., 
Slavery Era Policies Report (Aug. 2004), http://insurance.illinois.gov/Consumer/Slaveryinform 
ation/SlaverySummaryReport.asp (disclosing the slavery-era policies of five different insurers 
as required by legislative action). 
323 Some states have required more comprehensive disclosure of race-based practices. For 
example, in 2000, the State of New York Insurance Department directed each domestic and 
foreign life insurer and fraternal benefit society to review its past and current underwriting 
practices regarding race-based underwriting and to report its findings to the Department no 
later than August 15, 2000. Memorandum, Supplement 1 to Circular Letter No. 19, from 
N.Y. Ins. Dep't, to All Licensed Life Insurers and Fraternal Benefit Soc'ys (June 22, 2000), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2000/c100_19_sl_OO.htm. The Department specified 
that all relevant documents should be included in such a review, "including, but not limited 
to, rate charts, mortality tables, labor negotiation documents with distribution force unions, 
agent and broker contracts, compensation schedules, underwriting and agent manuals, 
applications, policy form filings, board of directors (and committee) minutes, and internal 
memoranda." Id. 
The Department defined race-based underwriting as including but not limited to one or 
more of the following practices: 
refusing to insure; refusing to continue to insure or limiting of the amount, 
extent or kind of coverage available; charging or collecting higher 
premiums or rates; making or requiring any rebate upon the amount paid; 
assigning of substandard risk classifications; crediting of or providing lower 
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slavery era is long past, the Jim Crow era is not, and there have 
been continuing effects from Jim Crow era practices on some 
individuals currently living.324 Revisiting these issues provides 
renewed impetus for scrutiny of other classification practices, 
including gender-based pricing practices. 
In coming years, budget-driven concerns about Social Security 
and other proposed entitlement reforms may lead to increased 
reliance on tax-funded or tax-favored private individual 
investment accounts for future retirement savings.325 The 
question of how those accumulations at retirement might be 
converted into lifetime annuity benefits raises important issues of 
government policy.326 Although employment-related pensions 
have been subject to the sex discrimination prohibitions under civil 
rights statutes since the 1970s and 1980s,327 whether lifetime 
annuities purchased by individuals with funds accumulated in 
personal tax-favored or funded accounts would be made available 
on a sex neutral basis remains to be established. Under current 
practices in the market for individual annuities, women receive 
lower benefits than men when sex-based actuarial tables are used 
dividends, policy benefits or nonforfeiture values; making any distinction as 
to policy terms or conditions; imposing greater underwriting requirements 
(medical vs. non-medical); and fixing of any fees or commissions in a 
manner as to encourage or discourage the writing or renewing of a specific 
type of policy. 
Id.; Heen, supra note 40, at 367 n.46. 
324 See generally David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of 
Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 137&-78 (2004) (distinguishing between the 
rationale for slavery-era and Jim Crow-era reparations). 
326 There were a number of proposals made during the second Bush presidency. See, e.g., 
Growing Real Ownership for Workers Act of 2005, H.R. 3304, 109th Cong. (dedicating 
Social Security revenue surpluses to personal accounts); see also Memorandum from 
Stephen C. Gross, Soc. Sec. Admin. Chief Actuary, and Alice H. Wade, Deputy Chief 
Actuary, to Representatives McCrery, Shaw, Johnson, Ryan, and Shadegg, at 2 (July 15, 
2005), http://www.ssa.gov/oactJsolvency/McCrery_20050715.pdf (assuming that inflation-
indexed lifetime annuities would be made available for purchase from accumulated funds 
but not specifying the actuarial assumptions used to compute benefits). 
326 For an example of an economic model for estimating the efficiency and distributional 
effects of shifting to gender neutral retirement annuities in the United Kingdom, see Amy 
Finkelstein, James Poterba & Casey Rothschild, Redistribution by Insurance Market 
Regulation: Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities 2 (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12205, 2006) (noting that their analysis "may also have 
broader implications for the design and regulation of annuitized payout structures 
associated with defined contribution Social Security systems") . 
327 See discussion supra Part III.c. 
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to compute lifetime benefits. Once the pocketbook implications of 
such ongoing reform proposals are more widely understood, 
women's rights organizations might press again for legislation 
banning sex discrimination in annuity payouts. 
In the future, demographics favor reform. Baby boomers born 
after World War II are beginning to enter their retirement 
years.328 This group promises to put unprecedented strain on the 
Social Security and Medicare systems;329 as a result, commercial 
annuities will likely grow in importance as a source of retirement 
income for boomers and the following generation of retirees.330 
Many baby boomer women, who won hard-fought rights to equal 
treatment in employment, credit, housing, and education during 
the 1970s and 1980s, will suffer the bottom-line pocketbook 
implications of higher rates or lower sex-based benefits when 
purchasing life annuities from private commercial insurance 
companies.331 Receiving lower benefits than similarly situated 
men with funds they have accumulated outside of employer 
provided pension plans might be unacceptable to them. 332 If 
women's organizations and civil rights groups successfully 
328 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FY2012 AND 
REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN FOR FY2011, Strategic Goal, Improve our Retiree and 
Other Core Services, 35-36 (noting that baby boomers are reaching their retirement years 
and estimating that nearly 80 million boomers will file for retirement benefits over the next 
twenty years-an average of 10,000 per day). 
329 Id. 
330 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown, Rational and Behavioral Perspectives on the Role of 
Annuities in Retirement Planning 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13537, 2007) (describing new annuitization products and stating that with the approaching 
retirements of baby boomers, "the issue of how to convert wealth into a secure stream of 
retirement income is increasingly on the minds of individuals, insurance companies, and 
policy makers"). 
331 See James M. Poterba, Retirement Security in an Aging Society 39, 41 (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 19930, 2014) (describing current annuity payout rates 
for men and women and the trend in retirement planning focusing on the need to generate a 
secure income stream in retirement). 
332 Gender-based benefits can also occur with funds accumulated in employment-related 
retirement plans. Although most employment-related retirement plans such as 401(k) plans 
provide lump sum payouts at retirement, a much smaller percentage of plans provide annuity 
payout options. Brown, supra note 330, at 8, 2~0 (noting also that it has been estimated by 
the Congressional Research Service that eighty-five percent of the workers included in a 
retirement plan at work participated in a plan that offered a lump-sum distribution at 
retirement). A female retiree who uses all or a part of a lump-sum plan distribution to 
purchase a private commercial lifetime annuity will pay higher premium rates or receive 
lower lifetime periodic annuity benefits than a similarly situated male retiree. 
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mobilize women's growing political clout on this issue, the women's 
movement could receive another opportunity to accomplish a major 
unfinished part of its agenda for economic equality. 
B. GREATER FEDERAL REGULATORY ROLE IN INSURANCE 
In the past, the American insurance industry generally has 
objected to proposed federal intrusions333 into the states' 
regulation of the business of insurance.334 For over a century, the 
business of insurance has been subject to state, not federal, 
regulation.335 However, in response to new competitive 
pressures336 and opportunities posed by national and international 
financial markets, the insurance industry has modified its 
longstanding opposition to federal regulation.337 Important 
components of the life insurance industry support the adoption of 
an optional federal regulatory regime for the business of 
insurance,338 modeled on the regulatory regime applied to the 
333 HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 442 (1999). For a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, leading figures 
in the insurance industry favored federal regulation when compliance with state 
regulations became more burdensome. According to a leading historian of the insurance 
business, the movement for federal regulation of insurance failed, however, for three main 
reasons: (1) it was opposed by an influential state regulator, New York's Commissioner of 
Insurance; (2) in the late 1860s, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 
168 (1868), that an insurance policy was not a transaction in commerce; and (3) the 
organization of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners in 1871 provided a 
mechanism for more uniform state regulation. R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE 
CONVENTION, 1906--1952, A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE, vol. 1, at 83-84 
(1953). 
334 See United States v. SouthEastern Underwriter's Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 546--53 (1944) 
(rejecting the insurers' argument to deem the insurance market beyond the regulatory 
power of Congress by holding that the business of insurance constituted interstate 
commerce, thereby overturning Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868)). 
335 In 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2011), 
which provided that the states would have primary authority for regulation of the business 
of insurance. 
336 See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106· 
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16 and 18 U.S.C.) (enhancing 
competition in the financial services industry). 
337 E.g., Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance Regulation: 
Is it Really What They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 292-93 (2002) (''Many 
insurance groups believe that insurers should have the same advantage of a single 
supervisory body as their competitors have."). 
338 See Insurance Regulation, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, http://www.acli.com/ 
lssues/lnsurance%20Regulation/Pages/65.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (outlining two 
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banking industry. 339 This may eliminate the broader objection "in 
principle"340 to federal regulation of insurance and focus the debate 
more clearly on the specific issues raised by federal civil rights 
legislation. 
In addition, as a practical matter, federal legislators and 
regulators are acquiring greater experience with the regulation of 
private insurance in the context of health care reform. In 
recognition of the states' history and expertise in regulating the 
insurance industry, the Affordable Care Act adopted a federal and 
state cooperative model of regulation by leaving to the states the 
enforcement of the Act's insurance regulatory reforms, the review 
of health insurance premiums, and assistance with consumer 
complaints against insurance companies.341 In addition, the Act 
requires consultation with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC)342 before the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) takes action in several key areas.343 
HHS must consult with NAIC, for example, before issuing 
regulations for the establishment and operation of health 
insurance exchanges and determining the requirements for the 
separate tracks for improving insurance regulation: to work with the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners to make the state-based system more uniform; and to support 
federal legislation that provides an optional federal charter for insurance companies); Press 
Release, Broad Coalition Asks Congress for an Optional Federal Charter for Insurers and 
Insurance Agents (June 14, 2005), http://www.bipac.netJafc/insurance_agents.pdf (stating 
that "135 national and regional insurance companies and agencies, banks, and trade 
associations asked the U.S. Senate to enact optional federal insurance charter legislation"). 
339 See OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 1, 
150 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000) ("[I]ncreasing segments of the insurance industry favor a 
federal chartering option so that the insurance industry will have a dual chartering option 
that has long been available to banking."). 
840 Id. at 11. 
34! Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Reflections on the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and the Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b)(2) (2010) (granting states 
the right to adopt regulations that implement Federal standards); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93(c) 
(2010) (concerning the authority to educate and assist consumers on health care plans); id. 
§ 300gg-94(a)(l) (granting authority of the Secretary and the States to review insurance 
premiums). 
342 For a brief description of the NAIC, see supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
343 See Jost, supra note 341, at 2045-46 (noting certain actions requiring consultation 
with the Department of Health and Human Services). 
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offering of qualified health plans through the exchanges.344 In 
contemplating a continuing role for the states and state insurance 
interest groups in the implementation of the federal health care 
reform legislation, the legislation follows a hybrid model in which 
federal regulation does not completely supplant state regulation of 
insurance. 345 Congress may or may not opt to follow a similar 
model in the context of civil rights reform. As noted earlier, prior 
proposed federal nondiscrimination legislation contained a 
requirement that state-based remedies be exhausted within a 
specified time period before filing a federal complaint.346 
Other more general regulatory reform in the United States and 
in Europe related to concerns about "too-big-to-fail" financial 
companies, including insurance companies, may result in the 
development of greater expertise within the federal government on 
insurance regulatory matters and a larger insurance regulatory 
role for the federal government. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act 
established the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the United 
States Department of the Treasury.347 Although the FIO does not 
currently play a regulatory or supervisory role348-a role that 
under current law is left to the states-it remains to be seen what 
role the federal government will play in the future. In any event, 
the FIO marks a recent, important step toward a greater federal 
governmental role with regard to insurance. 
Most relevant to civil rights issues, under the Act, the FIO 
monitors the availability and affordability of insurance for 
underserved communities, minorities, and low and moderate 
344 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)(2) (2010) ("In issuing the regulation under paragraph 
(1), the Secretary shall consult with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners .... "). 
345 For a discussion of transparency concerns about the role of state interest groups, 
including the NAIC, in federal administration of health care reform legislation, see 
generally Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 953 (2014). 
346 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
347 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, Title V, § 502, 124 Stat. 1376, 1580 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) 
(establishing the office). The Federal Insurance Office's authority extends to all lines of 
insurance except health insurance, long-term care insurance (except that which is includes 
life or annuity insurance components), and crop insurance. 31 U.S.C. § 313(d) (2012). 
348 See Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve Insurance 
Regulations?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 581-85 (2012) (discussing the functions of the insurance 
office). 
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income consumers.349 In its 2013 report to Congress,35o the FIO 
included among the areas it identified for direct federal 
involvement m regulation "the manner in which personal 
information is used for msurance pricmg and coverage 
purposes."351 In its discussion of risk classification issues, the 
report noted that important questions regarding the boundaries or 
limitations on the use of personal information should be answered 
in the context of insurance, and "regulatory policy and practice 
must clarify that the criteria and methodologies actually used by 
insurers not rely on impermissible or discriminatory factors."352 It 
observed that "[r]isk classification factors may be an appropriate 
subject for binding, uniform federal standards, particularly to the 
extent that insurance scoring methodologies involve factors that 
implicate rights secured under federal law."353 The report also 
acknowledged that the "technical evolution of insurance pricing 
has been driven by advances in data mining and technological 
capability," and that "responsible use of ... techniques that 
impose[] higher prices on truly risky behavior should be 
permitted."354 Nevertheless, according to the report, the 
availability of data "does not mean that any data is relevant to 
determining the insurance premiums they pay."355 The report 
announced that, "[i]n support of its responsibility to monitor access 
349 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(l)(B) (2012). 
350 The Act required FIO to submit a report to Congress on how the insurance regulatory 
system in the United States can be modernized and improved. Id. § 313(p). In 2011, the FIO 
invited public comments on the planned coverage of the report, to be submitted by December 
16, 2011. Public Input on the Report to Congress on How to Modernize and Improve the 
System oflnsurance Regulation in the U.S., 76 Fed. Reg. 64,174 (Dep't of Treas. Oct. 17, 2011) 
(notice and request for comment) (inviting comment on, among other topics, the "costs and 
benefits of potential Federal regulation of insurance across various lines of insurance (except 
health insurance)'). Although the report was due in January 2012, it was finally issued nearly 
two years later. FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEF'T OF THE TREAS., How TO MODERNIZE 
AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.trea 
sury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/How"/o20to%20Modernize%20and%201 
mprove%20the%20System%20of"/o20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the%20United%20Sta 
tes.pdf [hereinafter FIO, How TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES]. 
35! FIO, How TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 350, at 7-8. 
352 Id. at 57. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. 
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to affordable insurance to traditionally underserved communities, 
FIO will study the appropriate boundaries of use of personal 
information for insurance pricing and coverage purposes."356 
Although the Treasury did not specifically raise the issue of 
gender-based or race-based pricing in connection with its concern 
about the types of personal data used in insurance pricing, the 
area carved out in its report for additional study is broad enough 
to encompass the use of gender or race in risk classification 
systems. 
The FIO also advises the Treasury on other domestic and 
international insurance issues-in part to identify issues in that 
sector that could contribute to a broader systemic financial 
crisis357-and in part to respond to the need for a centralized 
governmental role in international negotiations. The FIO, for 
example, has the authority to represent the federal government at 
meetings of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) and similar international organizations.358 The FIO 
develops and coordinates federal policy on international insurance 
regulatory matters.359 Significantly, Dodd-Frank also provides the 
FIO with authority under limited circumstances to preempt state 
insurance measures if they conflict with certain covered 
international agreements.360 
Developments in Europe related to insurance financial solvency 
requirements or solvency equivalence standards under European 
Commission directives36l and by the IAIS362 require negotiation 
356 Id. 
357 The Dodd-Frank Act created a new "Financial Stability Oversight Council" with 
authority to identify systemically risky nonbank financial companies that will be subject to 
enhanced supervision by the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5322 (2012); Financial 
Stability and Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of 
Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (final rule and 
interpretive guidance). The Secretary of the Treasury serves as one of ten voting members 
of the council and the Director of the FIO serves as one of five nonvoting members, as does a 
state insurance commissioner designated by a selection process determined by the state 
insurance commissioners. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b) (2012). 
35s 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(l)(E) (2012). 
359 Id. § 313(c)(l)(E)-(H). 
360 Id. § 313(c)(F), (f), (j) (regarding state insurance measures that involve the less favorable 
treatment of foreign insurers but providing in a savings provision that the FIO may not 
preempt state measures that govern rates or premiums). 
36! See, e.g., Council Directive 20091138, 2009 O.J. (L 335) (EC), available at http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0138 [hereinafter Council Directive 
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and response from the U.S. government as well as representatives 
from state regulatory bodies if U.S. insurance companies are to 
continue to compete effectively in global insurance markets. For 
example, one of the objectives of the European Commission's 
"Solvency II" directive includes international regulatory 
convergence of equivalent standards.363 Thus, the United States 
and the European Union have been in bilateral transitional 
conversations about how the insurance regulatory system in the 
United States relates to those European solvency requirements. 364 
Both the federal government (through the Treasury and the FIO) 
and representatives of state regulators from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners have been involved in the 
discussions with the European Commission in attempts to 
translate the very different regulatory system in the United States 
into European language.365 
In sum, how the state regulatory system of insurance in the 
United States fits within the regulatory systems developing 
abroad in the globalized insurance market remains to be seen; in 
any event, in the meantime, international negotiations require a 
more active role and development of expertise by the federal 
government in the business of insurance-an overall trend that 
may fit as well within a more active civil rights role for the federal 
government in the domestic insurance sector. 
2009/138]; Council Directive 2014/51, 2014 O.J. (L 153/1) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.eu 
ropa.eu/legal-content/ENfl'XT/?uri=uriserv:OJ .L_. 2014.153. 01.0001. 01. ENG. 
362 The IAIS, a voluntary association of insurance regulators from 140 countries, has 
advanced several initiatives, including non-binding insurance core principles, a common 
framework for the supervision of internationally active insurance groups, and proposed global 
financial stability determinations, known as G-SIFI (for globally systemically important 
financial institutions), analogous to the determinations to be made by Dodd-Frank's Financial 
Stability Oversight Council in the United States. Insurance Core Principles, Standards, 
Guidance, and Assessment Methodology, INTERNATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
SUPERVISORS 4-9 (Oct. 1, 2011, as amended), http://www.iaisweb.org/lnsurance-Core-Principl 
es-material-adopted-in-2011-795. 
363 Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 361, at 11. 
364 EU-U.S. Insurance Project: The Way Forward, at 2 (July 2014), available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/201407-way-forward_en.pdf. 
365 Id. at 3. 
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C. UNISEX INSURANCE RATES IN EUROPE 
In 2004, the Council of the European Union366 issued a directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between women 
and men367 in the "access to and supply of goods and services," 
with specific reference to insurance and related financial 
services.368 The directive found that the "use of actuarial factors 
related to sex is widespread in the provision of insurance"369 and 
that to ensure equal treatment between men and women, it 
provided in Article 5(1) that "the use of sex" as an actuarial factor 
should "not result in differences in individuals' premiums and 
benefits."370 This has since been referred to as the directive's 
"unisex rule" of premiums and benefits. 
The directive initially applied to new contracts issued after 
December 21, 2007, with a limited deferral period permitted371 
under a modification of an earlier draft of the directive, which would 
have outlawed the practice of gender-based differential pricing in 
366 The European Council of Ministers is composed of ministers of member state 
governments who have the authority to bind their member states. See ALEC STONE SWEET, 
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 46-47 (2004). The Council, whose members are 
required to act independently and to promote the EU's interests, acts on proposals of the 
European Commission, which has the power to draft and propose legislation and to 
implement EU policy. Id. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union authorizes 
the Council to issue a Directive when "acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation." Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 
previously the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community), arts. 13(1)), 19(1), 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 083/56), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=O 
J:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML. 
367 The principle of equal treatment between men and women can be found, among other 
places, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 21, 23, 2000 O.J. 
368 Council Directive 2004/113, 2004 O.J. (L. 373) 38 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 
2004/113]. 
369 Id. 
310 Id. at 41. 
371 The Directive applied to "new contracts concluded after the date of transposition" of 
the Directive. Id. at 38. The Directive provided for a transposition date of December 21, 
2007, though that date could be deferred for an additional two years. Id. at 41, 43. 
Requiring women to pay more for insurance coverage for "[c]osts related to risks of 
pregnancy and maternity'' was to be considered a form of "direct discrimination" and was 
expressly prohibited by the Directive. Id. at 39. 
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insurance by the summer of 2005.372 The final modified version of 
the directive, following an active lobbying campaign by the 
insurance industry,373 observed that "[c]ertain categories of risks 
may vary between the sexes,'' and in Article 5(2), allowed member 
states "to permit exemptions from the rule of unisex premiums and 
benefits."374 The directive specified that the exemptions were to be 
based on reliable data made available to the public, and any 
exemptions must be regularly reviewed. 375 Furthermore, 
exemptions were not permitted where legislation in individual 
countries has barred sex-based premiums and benefits.376 
Legislation enacted by Belgium in 2007 to exempt life insurance 
from the application of the directive was challenged in the 
constitutional court of Belgium by a non-profit consumer 
organization and two private individuals.377 Because their action 
372 Several major member countries objected to the earlier proposal. See, e.g., Robert 
Watts, EU Forced to Drop Plans for Unisex Premiums, TELEGRAPH (June 14, 2004, 10:51 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/2888015/EU·forced·to-d 
rp-plans-for-unisex-premiums.html (discussing the elimination of the insurance clause from 
the EU's proposed gender directive). For background on prior consideration of this issue in 
Europe, including discussion of member country provisions and a "missed opportunity" by 
the European Community Court of Justice to eliminate gender discrimination in 
occupational pension plans, see generally Wouter P.J. Wils, Insurance Risk Classifications 
in the EC: Regulatory Outlook, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1994). See also DAVID 
PANNICK, SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW 189-96 (1985) (discussing the exception for insurance 
in sex discrimination statutes enacted during the 1970s and early 1980s in the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia); Matthias Jestaedt, Protection Against 
Discrimination and Private Autonomy, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1027, 1032 
(2005) (discussing European antidiscrimination law that prevents sex discrimination in 
access to goods and services); Matthias Mahlmann, Prospects of German Antidiscrimination 
Law, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1045, 1048, 1062 (2005) (discussing Germany's 
post-war antidiscrimination policies and prevention of differing treatment for pregnancy 
and motherhood in insurance). 
373 For a discussion of the lobbying campaign by insurance companies and the internal 
inconsistency in the directive resulting from those modifications, see Geert De Baere & 
Eveline Goessens, Gender Differentiation in Insurance Contracts After the Judgment in Case 
C-236/09, Association Beige Des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Conseil Des Ministres, 
18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 360 (2012). Business interests in the United States also weighed in 
by expressing their concerns about the EU proposals. See Position Paper on Gender 
Discrimination (American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union), Aug. 2, 2004, at 5 
(arguing that the proposed directive would "explicitly ... undermine the principle of risk-
based pricing," which would prove, "over the long-term ... to be socially inequitable"). 
374 Council Directive 2004/113, supra note 368, at 39. 
31; Id. 
31s Id. 
377 Case C-236/09, Ass'n Beige des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others, Opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/docume 
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for annulment questioned the validity of Article 5(2) of the 
directive, the court referred the case to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling.378 The ECJ in Association 
Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Council declared 
Article 5(2) invalid effective beginning on December 21, 2012. It 
held that Article 5(2), by allowing member states to maintain 
without temporal limitation an exemption from the unisex rule of 
Article 5(1), was inconsistent with the purpose of the directive as 
defined by the legislature-to achieve the objective of equal 
treatment between men and women in relation to the calculation 
of insurance premiums and benefits-and thus, was incompatible 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.379 
Commenting on the significance of the ECJ's ruling in Test-
Achats, the European Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding, 
the EU's Justice Commissioner, began by referring to landmark 
rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court involving employee retirement 
contributions and benefits: 
Today is an important moment for gender equality in 
the European Union. 30 years ago, the Supreme Court 
of the United States ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits different treatment of insured persons 
on the basis of their sex in connection with pension 
funds. Today, the EU's Court of Justice ruled that 
different insurance premiums for women and men 
constitute sex discrimination and are not compatible 
with the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Member States are not allowed to derogate from this 
important principle in their national legislation. The 
relevant "opt out" clause in the Council's 2004 
Directive on gender equality is thus illegal.38o 
ntldocument.jsf?text=&docid=82589&pagelndex=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&cc=first&p 
art=l&cid=910025. 
31s Id. 
379 Case C-236/09, Ass'n Beige des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v. Council (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documentldocument.jsf?text=&docid=80019&pagelndex=O 
&doclang= EN &mode= lst&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=910025. 
380 Sex Discrimination in Insurance Contracts: Statement by European Commission Vice-
President Viviane Reding, the EU's Justice Commissioner, on the European Court of 
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In addition, after noting that all EU member countries 
currently permitted insurers to use sex as a risk-rating factor in 
life insurance and annuities, she observed that in auto insurance, 
unisex premiums were already applied in Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and 
Slovenia. 381 She announced that she would meet in the coming 
months with the insurance industry to discuss the implications of 
the ECJ's judgment.382 She ended by observing "[f]ollowing today's 
judgment, it is now clear that an insurance company must not 
distinguish between women and men; all customers must be 
treated equally. This is a matter of respect for fundamental 
rights. It is now also becoming a matter of good business 
practices."383 
After meetings with representatives of the insurance industry 
and other interested groups, the European Commission issued 
guidelines on its directive in light of the ECJ's judgment in Test-
Achats. 384 In general, the guidelines specify that the "unisex rule" 
would apply to contracts entered into after December 20, 2012, 
and that after that date, any opt-out in national law under Article 
5(2) would cease to be effective.385 They offer detailed guidance on 
what constitutes a "contract'' or "new contract" for that purpose, 
after stating that uniform application requires a conception of 
contract that might be different from the contract laws of the 
member states. 386 
The guidelines also describe the ways that sex can be used for 
purposes of overall cost and solvency determinations. Thus, 
although sex cannot be used as a factor for calculating an 
individual's premiums or benefits, it may be used in rating the 
risk of a group in the aggregate.387 Accordingly, information on 
sex may still be collected and used for risk assessment and overall 
cost monitoring purposes, including the following: internal risk 
Justice's ruling in the Test-Achats case, Brussels (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://europa. 
eu/rapid/press-release_MEM0-11-123_en.htm. 
381 Id. 
382 Id. 
383 Id. 
384 EC Guidelines, supra note 22. 
385 Id. ~~ 5, 6, 24. 
386 Id. ~~ 9, 10-12. 
387 Id.~ 14. 
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assessment, particularly to comply with solvency rules and in 
monitoring their portfolio mix from an aggregate pr1cmg 
perspective; setting the price of reinsurance so long as it does not 
affect the price for an individual; and in certain targeted 
marketing and advertising to influence their portfolio mix as long 
as they do not refuse access to a specific product because of a 
person's sex.388 The Commission also clarified that the unisex rule 
does not extend to other factors independent of sex such as family 
history or health status.389 Factors correlated with sex may be 
used so long as they do not put one sex at a particular 
disadvantage; such indirect discrimination is permissible if there 
is a legitimate aim390 or the sex-correlated factor is a risk in its 
own right. 391 
The guidelines clarify that the Directive applies only to 
insurance and retirement annuities or pensions which are private, 
voluntary, and separate from the employment relationship since 
another directive deals with the equal treatment of men and 
women in relation to occupational pensions.392 In addition, the 
directive notes that it has no application to the use of age and 
disability, factors that the Directive classifies as not correlated 
with gender.393 
Finally, the Commission announced that it will be monitoring 
the implementation of the guidelines394 and urged the insurance 
industry "to make the necessary adjustments and offer attractive 
unisex products to consumers without an unjustified impact on the 
overall price levels."395 It closed by noting that it would remain 
388 Id. 
389 Id. (relating to life and health underwriting, where certain physiological differences 
may have an impact that is different for each sex). 
390 Id. ii 16. 
391 Id. iJ 17; see also id. iJ 17 n.15 (giving an example of permissible differentiation in auto 
insurance based on the size of a car engine even if statistically men drive cars with more 
powerful engines; but providing a contrary impermissible example of differentiation based 
on the size or weight of a person in that context). 
392 Id. iii! 21-23; see Shilton, supra note 316, at 416 (stating that the status in Europe of sex-
based mortality tables within employment-related pensions "continues to be governed directly 
by article 119 and Directive 861387, which combine to outlaw [sex-based mortality tables] that 
produce sex-differentiated employee contributions and benefits, but leave loopholes for [sex-
based mortality tables] to continue affecting transfer/commuted values .... "). 
393 EC Guidelines, supra note 384, iii! 18-20. 
394 Id. iJ 24. 
395 Id. ii 25. 
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"vigilant" to detect any such unjustified rise in prices, including 
under the tools "available under competition law in the event of 
alleged anti-competitive conduct,"396 and that it would report on 
the implementation of the unisex rule in 2014 in a report on the 
implementation of the Directive.397 
In summary, a uniform "unisex rule" was achieved in Europe 
through unified legislative action. Despite the insurance lobby's 
success in adding an "opt-out" provision for member countries, the 
European Court of Justice invalidated the opt-out provision, 
holding that such a provision undermined the legislation's purpose 
of achieving equal treatment of men and women. Now all member 
countries must conform their national legislation to the unisex 
standard for insurance rates and benefits. Time will tell how the 
insurance markets in Europe will adjust to the unisex rule and 
how the pricing changes will affect men and women in different 
lines of insurance. 
Because of globalized markets and trends toward regulatory 
convergence abroad, it is likely that the developments in Europe 
will provide those U.S. companies with foreign business and 
foreign affiliates398 an incentive to accommodate their 
international operations to the new rules and to gain familiarity 
with the European standard of equal treatment of men and 
women. The enactment of comprehensive civil rights legislation 
banning discrimination in insurance would not only create 
domestic uniformity on these issues, but it would also create 
greater international uniformity and result in a stronger 
commitment to equal treatment of men and women. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Previous domestic and international efforts to eliminate 
insurance rates based on race or gender provide valuable lessons 
about the principles and practicalities of future reform. Common 
396 Id. 
397 Id. "if 26. As of this writing, the Commission has solicited comments on implementation 
by member states from a network of equality bodies in member states and from various 
stakeholders and nongovernmental organizations, but the report has not yet been issued. 
398 See Scism, supra note 296, at AlO (reporting that "Prudential, the nation's second 
largest life insurer, earns about half its operating income in other countries" and that 
"about 30% ofMetLife's operating income now comes from outside the U.S."). 
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themes run through the history of reform efforts extending from 
the last century to the last few years: first, there must be a 
regulatory structure available to achieve uniform application of 
nondiscrimination rules; and second, after political consensus has 
been reached to use that structure to put the nondiscrimination 
principle into action, experience shows that the insurance industry 
has the practical capacity to adapt its pricing practices to such a 
principle while maintaining its overall solvency or profitability. 
Pricing practices can be successfully changed, as shown by the 
transition under federal law over thirty years ago to unisex rates 
and benefits in employment-related insurance and retirement 
plans, by the implementation of state-level antidiscrimination 
provisions applicable to different lines of insurance, and more 
recently, by the on-going transition to unisex rates in the context 
of private, voluntary commercial insurance in Europe. The 
nondiscrimination rules generally have been applied prospectively 
rather than retroactively, giving the insurance industry time to 
adjust to the new rules without unsettling past contractual 
expectations. In both domestic and international settings, 
solvency issues have been addressed under new unisex rules by 
permitting the use of actuarial statistics and well-developed 
methodologies to determine overall costs and reserves for the 
insurer's business in the aggregate but not to determine rates or 
benefits that differ for similarly situated individual men and 
women. 
Given these principles and practicalities of reform, it is time for 
Congress to write another chapter of civil rights law by enacting 
comprehensive federal civil rights legislation to ban discrimination 
in insurance. As Martin Luther King, Jr. said a half century ago, 
before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "The arc of 
the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."399 
399 King paraphrased the words originally attributed to an American abolitionist minister, 
Theodore Parker, from a sermon originally published in 1853: 
I do not pretend to understand the moral universe, the arc is a Jong one, my 
eye reaches but little ways. I cannot calculate the curve and complete the 
figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by conscience. But from 
what I see I am sure it bends towards justice. 
THEODORE PARKER, TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 84-85 (1853); see also Theodore Parker and 
the "Moral Universe," NPR (Sept. 2, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/sto 
ry.php?storyld-12960946. 
